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Abstract
This study attempts to analyze the political change of a HK
community, Tuen Mun. Three external factors, the administrative
and political reforms carried out by the government, the HK
democratic movement and the urbanization process, are explored to
delineate their joint effects in shaping the local political
structure in Tuen Mun. In the pre-urbanized period, the local
political power was monopolized by a number of rural elites, but
as urbanization took place, their power was shared by some
outsiders. However, as the 1997 problem emerged, the colonial
government started her decolonization process through introducing
popular elections at the local level. As a result, many pressure
groups members have begun actively participating in seizing these
released power since 1985. In Tuen Mun, instead of previous
monolithic one, a bifurcated power structure appears. There seems
to be two competing forces: the traditional and the pressure
groups. In the earlier stage, the democratic camp successfully
intruded into the local political system and even had a tendency
to replace most of the traditional leaders in 85 and 86
elections. Nevertheless, the traditional elites can quickly
adjust their strategies and strike back in 88 and 89 elections.
Moreover, the democratic camp faces with intense internal
cleavage, this greatly reduce their ability to contend with their
rivals. Up to now, the two factions are still in a -game of
tug-of-war, neither of them are able to rid out the other.
Although the democratic groups cannot take all the local power,
they successfully force their competitors to be more responsive
to the needs of the residents._
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1I. Introduction
A. Theoretical Review
In the 1950s and 1960s, there were numerous studies about
the community politics in America. At that time, a very hot
controversy of local politics was about whether the community
power structure is elitist or pluralistic. The most classic works
of both schools of thought are: the elite-stratification model
represented by Floyd Hunter's Community Power Structure: A Study
of Decision-Makers' (1953) and the pluralist alternative
exemplified by Robert Dalh's 'Who Govern?: Democracy and Power in
an American City' (1961). Hunter found that the community power
structure was typically a monolithic one in which a group of
elites dominated all the community affairs while Dalh's finding
showed that the community decisions were made through competition
among different interest groups, none of them were in an absolute
dominant position. However, the major reason for their divergent
empirical results may be their dissimilarities in methodology.
Hunter's methodology is based on survey research of the
reputational aspect of power in which the informants are required
to name and rank a number of influential figures. The final list
of leaders consists of those individuals received the greatest
number of nominations by the informants or whose average ranking
is above a certain arbitrarily set level. While Dahl's approach
is an event analysis which is based on studying who actually
effected in the decision-making processes of some `important'
selected issues. The reputational methodology has the following
criticisms: 1. it does not measure leadership per se, but rather
2the reputation for leadership, so its validity is primarily
rested on the assumption that a prestigious persons who are
perceived as powerful by the others can exert their influences to
achieve their goals in actuality 2. it ignores the fact that
different groups of elites probably have different scopes of
interests, and thus there may be several structures of influence.
The existence of a monolithic power structure is presupposed
antecedently rather verified after a careful empirical
examination 3. it also presupposes a prior linkage among these
elites and treats them as a ruling group rather than merely an
aggregate of separated individual political actors 4. even if
there is a high correlation between reputation and power per se,
this approach may still not exactly identify leaders due to the
inaccuracies in respondent perceptions, the different conceptions
of power between the interviewers and respondents and the
arbitrary nature of the cut-off points in the tabulation of
nominations and rankings. (Bonjean and Olson 1964:165) The
decisional methodology also has several inherent limitations: 1.
the researchers of this approach often begin with observing
committee and organizational meetings, but this may appear to
accept the assumption that those holding positions of authority
actually make key decisions while those who do not occupy such
positions do not effect the results 2. the criteria of selecting
the decisions and issues for study is rather arbitrary 3. its
main focus on those overt controversial issues which actually
appear in the formal meetings may lead the researchers to ignore
those actors who are able to keep latent issues, which may be
3actually the most important issues in a community, from emerging
into open controversy. Thus the real power relationship among the
political actors may be distorted. (Bonjean and Olson 1964:166-7)
Although these two approaches were criticized on several grounds,
and the choice between pluralism and elitist interpretations
might rest on ideological rather than empirical consideration,
the pluralistic interpretation gained great popularity and became
a fashion at that time. However, the elitist theory came back in
late 60s and early 70s. The new elitist theorists not only
emphasize that it is the elites of the groups instead of the
groups themselves determine the final decisions, but also they
attempt to figure out the interlocking relationships among the
power elites by employing network analysis. Moreover, the
decisional methodology was further theoretically and empirically
challenged by Bachrach and Baratz. In attacking Dahl's mere
stress on the decision-making stage, they focused on the
predecision process too, a stage of agenda setting. In their
study of the Poverty Program in Baltimore, they highlighted that
the powerful political elites effectively excluded the poor from
the decision-making process and removed any consideration of
their demands from the agenda of government. Thus the demands of
the poor hardly emerged as recognized problems or issues to the
4government officials under these nondecision-making processes.)
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970: 92-103) In reality, nondecision-making
is quite common in the political communities, as Schattschneider
admirably remarked,
All forms of political organization have a bias in
favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and
the suppression of others because organization is the
mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into
politics while others are organized out (quoted from
Bachrach and Baratz 1970:8)
Apart from using direct forces or the threat of sanctions,
nondecision-making can be exercised indirectly through
mobilization of bias existing in the political system: 1. invokes
an existing bias like a norm, precedent, rule or procedure to
squelch a threatening demand or incipient issues 2. reshape or
strengthen the mobilization of bias by adding new rules and
procedures, or reinforcing and rationalizing some favorable norms
1.A nondecision is a decision that results in suppression or
thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or
interests of the decision-maker. Accordingly, a nondecision-
making is a means by which demands for change in the existing
allocation of benefits and privileges in the relevant decision
making arena or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed
in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process.
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970:44)
5or principles.2 Thus a seemingly pluralist community political
system may appear rather authoritarian with a number of power
elites dominated in all the important issues while these issues
are coverted through a nondecision-making process. Bachrach and
Baratz's theory is beautifully summarized by Zelditch et. al.
(1983:6) as following tables:
The Policy Process, Showing Nondecision Outcomes
Table la. The Principal Stages of the Policy Process
Predecision Decision Postdecision
Stage Stage Stage
An issue is A decision A policy is




Policy is notAn issue or No decisionNon-
is made implementedDecision policy is not
on the agendaMaking
2. For instance,` the conservative groups in HK often hamper the_
democratic movement by mobilizing the political imperative of
HK's prosperity and stability and declaring that further
democratization will stir up many instabilizing influences.
6Table lb. The Stages of Predecision Politics
Identification Specification Agenda
Stage Stage Stage
An issue is Objectives, Policies x, y,...
identifiedDecision alternatives, are adopted as
and definedMaking and relations an agenda for
as `political between them decision
are formulated
Non- An issue is not A preferred A preferred
Decision identified policy x is policy x is
Making and defined not considered not on the
as `political'
agenda
Steven Lukes (1974) even put one step further by suggesting
a radical view of power. In addition to Dahl's one dimensional
and Bachrach and Baratz's two dimensional views of power, he
noted that power can be exercised through the socially structured
and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and practices of
institutions which influence, shape and determine people's want.
This makes others' genuine interests even hard to be aware, let
alone emerging into grievances which may or may not be denied
entry into the political process in form of issues. In other
words, the existing social, cultural and political institutions
impose some kinds of false consciousness which deprive the people
of recognizing their real interests. Although there are many
technical and operational problems in identifying the genuine
interests of the people, Lukes' radical view of power does lead
-to a structural or institutional approach, other than the
behavioral individualistic ones, to study the shaping as well as
the perpetuating processes of-the existing political structure.
In both of the elitist and pluralistic approaches, they all
neglect the autonomous role of the state: the elitist approaches,
7especially those endowed with Marxist orientations, often treat
the state as merely an instrument of the ruling groups to
achieve their interests, while the pluralist approaches too
emphasize the autonomy and the capability of the interest groups
and only regard the state as a political field for these groups
to struggle for power. The state is viewed as a network of
interacting, competitive and cooperative institutions of formal
government rather a corporate political actor.
In the pluralist model, though the chief political actors
are not the atomized citizens but the groups organized around
specific interests, as challenged by their critics, these groups
are not exactly equal in power and the overt influences of the
weaker groups may be undermined through the nondecision-making of
their more powerful counterparts or the imposition of false
consciousness by the existing social and political structures
which favor the more powerful groups. In facing these criticisms,
many pluralists attempt to revise their original positions. Waste
(1986) identified four variants of pluralism in terms of their
degree of inclusiveness. Inclusiveness refers to the level of
participation by citizens in the policymaking process, which
consists of: 1. the mobilized interests of the residents, 2.
number of citizens who have mobilized that interests and achieved
a role in the policymaking processes, 3. the number of groups and
individuals who have succeeded in having some impact on the
formation of policy with respect to, that mobilized interest.
These four forms of pluralism are: classical pluralism,
hyperpluralism, stratified pluralism and privatized pluralism.
8The classical pluralists see public policy as a tug of war
between various approximately equal interest groups that often
ends in a delicate balance or compromise. It presupposes that
every citizens are able to form a group to fight for their own
interests and the government, which instead of taking a role in
policy making, only acts as a broker among these competing groups
as well as the agent to implement the policy pre-determined by
these groups. The hyperpluralists, however, do not think that all
political groups are roughly equal. Alternately, they admitted
that groups varies in their strategic access to policy makers,
but those lacking such access could still form alliances with
possessing groups in order to protect themselves. The stratified
pluralists further admit that most communities are divided into
two strata: the political activists and the larger group of
politically inactive persons, but the membership of these two
strata often change across issues such that the possibility of
only one definite group dominated all the community affairs is
quite low. In contrast to the classical pluralism, stratified
pluralists further confess that the holding of power is limited
to those political activists only. Finally, the privatized
pluralism is even more close to the elitist interpretations of
power structure. Its advocates acknowledge that in many policy
arenasL only a limited- number of participants have usurped the
authority and resources of public policymaking for private ends.
These political active groups attempt to force government to
respond to their interest through exercising their own private
nniJAr fnr instance the economic power held by some capitalists
9or the threat of strike by some organized unions. Nevertheless,
these groups are not united, do not care about big or general
issues, and do not control parties, the presidency, or the
Supreme Court. Therefore, considerable space in public
policymaking is still in the hand of the government. The most
crucial distinction between the elitist analysis and privatized
pluralism is that the coordination among members of different
privatized arenas is still problematic. In a nutshell, the
differences among these four variants of pluralism are presented
below, (Waste 1986:120, 123)











In contrast, the elitist approach is characterized by its
emphasis on the concentrated interlocking among the power
elites. As Mills (1956) portrayed that the national power
structure of the US was dominated by the troika of economic,
-military and political elites, while Hunter (1953)- depicted a
similar picture of the community power structure in Atlanta in
which controlled by the economic elites. Though they differed in
the composition of the power groups, they both posited a intense
10
interlocking among the power elites. Interlocking and overlapping
among power elites arise from several processes: 1. coincident
objective interests 2. numerous interchange of commanding roles
at the top of several institutions 3. common social origins and
educational careers and 4. intimate social and business
associations. (Knoke 1981: 289) Mizruchi (1987) also listed out
seven sources of cohesion within the capitalist class: 1.
kinship ties 2. similar backgrounds which impose a similar
worldview among the capitalists through socialization 3. social
club membership which reinforces solidarity already existed
among the power elites 4. policymaking organizations which play
a role in the mediation of the structurally generated conflicts
among the elites 5. financial institutions which act similar
role of the policymaking organizations, but differ in
specializing within the business world 6. the inner group which
has a much wider perspective in promoting the long-run interests
of business as a whole, so that it can interpose in the
structural conflicts caused by certain policies which cannot
favor all businesses, but even harm some 7. the state which
functions as a major mediators among the businesses when they are
incapable of seeing beyond their parochial, short-run interests.
The former three sources can promote the cohesiveness among the
power elites through bringing them together psychologically
through prescribing them a common mentality and life style,
while the latters avoid their splitting through mediating their
internal conflicts and foster a policy unity. Consequently, all
these processes give a common consciousness to the power elites
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and make them constitute a cohesive ruling group. The elitists
think that even the interelite disagreements really exist, they
are minor compared to the overwhelming consensus on some
fundamental, inviolable principles like a commitment of private
ownership, sanctity of the profit motive and a positive but
limited role for the government in regulating economy and
society. The power elites are also insulated from the nonelite
portion of the population due to their politically disorganized
nature. (Knoke 1981:292) However, like the pluralist theories,
the elitist theories seldom come with a definite unitary
consensus, as in Burton and Higley's survey of the elitist
literature (1987: 225-31), they found that two contradictory
dimensions coexist in their classification of the elites:
the relative integration or fragmentation of
intraelite relations, and the relative consensus or
dissensus in elite beliefs and attitudes....
Exceptionally tight integration and marked consensus
(at least outwardly) are seen as hallmarks of elites in
communist and fascist countries, whereas severe
fragmentation and sharp dissensus are thought to
characterize elites in most developing countries. The
treatment of elites in Western democracies is less
uniform. however. (Burton and Higley 1987:229)
There seems to be a midway between the elitism and
pluralism: the multi-elites theory. The privatized pluralism is
one of the multi-elites variant which attempt to mediate between
the two extreme positions between the pluralism and elitism. As
noted by Knoke (1981: 286-8), the multi-elites theorists
recognize the-major political actors are the elites of the groups
rather than the groups themselves, however, it differs from the
power elite model by emphasizing the separateness among the
elites. The disunity of the elites is mainly due to their
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functional distinctiveness: these elites only enjoy relative
autonomy of operation and exercising power within their
circumscribed fields. Their powers are confined to their
dominated arenas and the interelite connections, though sometimes
exist, are hard to make them become a cohesive unchecked ruling
group. Much of the power in other untouched public realms are
controlled by the state. As Burton and Higley (1987) suggested
that further researches on the power structure should be focused
on the social structures and dynamic which determine 1. the
degree of inevitability of elites 2. the variability of elites
and 3. elite-nonelite interdependence. In all bureaucratic
societies public leadership is inevitable, but it does not mean
that elites domineer all the parts in the civil society. In
different socio-political systems people enjoy different degree
of self-administration in their private daily living. Further the
inevitability thesis does not imply that a unitary elite group is
always and everywhere present in societies, the unity of elites
depends on the degree of differentiation of the socio-political
system as well as the patterns of interactions among these
functionally distinct elites. Hence, the variability and the
degree of unity of the elites should be posited as empirical
question rather than ideological or theoretical commitment.
Moreover, the governed mass are not totally manipulated by the
elites, they also impose some constraints on the elites' behavior
and the policy outcome. As Burton and Higley (1987:231-5) noted
in the past most of the elitist theorists used to granting a
zero-sum relationship between the elites and nonelites, however,
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many recent studies on collective actions and states have
directed theorists' attention to the interdependency between
elites and nonelites. In order to govern and maintain their
power, elites must appeal to mobilize nonelites support. But the
effectiveness of elite appeal and mass mobilization depend on
existing material interests and nonrational inclinations of the
nonelites. Again, the scope and degree of limitation prescribed
to the elites are also varied according to the nature of
socio-political system under concerned. Therefore, the finding in
New Haven cannot straightly be generalized to Atlanta and the
experience of the US cannot simply be extended to other
developing countries.
In contrast with the American tradition of studying
community power structure, Cochrane (1986) tried to see how that
power may be challenged or diffused by the development of more
democratic process. He noted,
Community politics can be seen as a potential source
of fundamental challenge, or at any rate as a living
example of the ways in which society might be organized
in the future. But it has also been supported by others
as means of adjusting to new demands without directly
challenging existing political and social structures. A
third interpretation of community politics would stress
still more modest aims, in particular the need to
control the excesses of state bureaucracy to restrict
its expansion and to encourage rational decision-
making. (Cochrane 1986:53)
Toward the democratic ideal, there are two forces framing
the nature of community politics: the grassroot challenge and the
reform from above. Alinsky may, be the most prominent theorist as
well as practitioner in advocating democratizing the neighborhood
through community organizing. In his `Reveille for Radicals'
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(1964:17), he named himself as a radical who deeply interested in
social planning but just as deeply suspicious of, and
antagonistic to, any idea of plans that work from the top down.
He thought that democracy is working only from the bottom up.
Against the liberals' passivity,3 he trained a lot of community
organizers to help the 'Havenot'4 establish People's Organizat-
ions so as to fight for their needs and self-governing. The major
principles of organizing are summarized by Williams (1985:73)
as: 1. the poor neighborhood gets only what it is strong enough
to get through organization 2. the organizer proves to people
that they can act effectively and then gets out of their way 3.
the organizer has to believe in people if they are to believe in
themselves 4. self-interest, not altruism, moves people, and 5.
when the neighborhood organization wants somethings, it should
3. He also contrasted the radical with the liberal. The liberal
as described by Alinsky (1964): Liberals like people with their
heads, radical like people with both their heads and their
hearts (p.19) Liberals-fear power or its application (p.22)
liberal ask for change and radical fight for change (p.25)
Liberals... lay claim to the precious quality of impartiality,
of cool objectivity, and to a sense of mystical impartial
justice... Caught on the horns of this dilemma they are paralyzed
into immobility. (p.20)
4. Alinsky delineated three kinds of people: the Haves (the upper
class), the Have-Nots (the lower class) and the Have-a-Little,
Want Mores (the middle class). (1971:18)
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cut through official bureaucracy. Above all, Alinsky urged the
organizers to weld the community together by carrying out E
series of short-term campaigns which are capable of mobilizing
the people on the basis of real, achievable demands directed
against identified enemies, usually the government. However,
Alinsky's approach faces with a lot of problems: 1. it is
impossible to deal with the structural problems of economic and
social inequality at both local and national levels 2. they
can only win in some trivial issues at significant cost in time
and effort without altering the basic logic of delivering public
services 3. it may encourage a shift away form 'top dogs' toward
easier identified `middle dogs' who do not have any
decision-making power at the local level. (Cochrane 1986:55-6) 4.
the availability of issues that can be articulated by the
organizers to mobilize the people is always rare and 5. the
mobilizability of the residents is further restricted by their
time and enthusiasm and this makes the organizers hard to
maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the People's
Organizations. Nevertheless, even though the Alinsky's approach
cannot enforce community democracy, many needs of the local
residents can really be met through the actions of the
neighborhood organizations. Apart from bottom-up democratization,
community democracy can be initiated top down by the state which
want to bridge up its gap with the mass and to be responsive to
them. The major reasons for the government to take up this kind
of democratization are: 1. she want to carry out a corporate
pattern of management which does not embark from existing
16
departmental boundaries but from an overview perspective which
allowing an authority-wide policy to be developed 2. this
corporate approach require a rather democratic community
involvement. (Cochrane 1986:61) Nevertheless, this kind of
advancement often raises some unintended consequences which
beyond the control of the government. It may also induce
challenges from the grassroot who demand a radical change of the
basic political structure. This makes the government hesitate to
continue or even withdraw from the original program. From the
government's outlook, in contrast with the bottom-up one, the
community politics is treated as a control system rather than a
democratic transforming process. Her predominant purpose is to
legitimize the status quo by delivering more appropriate services
to meet the genuine needs of the people, hence once she finds the
situation uncontrollable, she will halt or even suppress any
further challenging forces.
There is still another school of thought conceptualizing the
community or village politics in the developing countries as
clientelist politics. The major subject matter is the patron-
client relationship embedded in the political systems. The
patron-client relationship-- an exchange relationship between
roles-- may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two person)
ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an
individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own
influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or
both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part,
reciprocates by offering general support and assistance,
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including personal services, to the patron. (Scott, 1976:125) Ir,
contrast to the group model of politics which is prevalent in the
West democracy, Lande (1976b) suggested a dyad model to study the
politics in developing countries. In this dyadically structured
political system, the relationships between leaders and followers
are: 1. it rests on the single leader with his random collection
of followers 2. it is leader-centered rather than
group-centered 3. the bonds that tie the system together are
vertical and dyadic 4. the interests that unite the leader and
his followers are particular rather than categorical 5. these
interests differ in accordance with the status of those
concerned 6. the ties between the leader and each follower rest
on reciprocity 7. this kind dyadic leadership-followership
systems are both dynamic and unstable and finally 8. these
leadership-followership systems are likely to consist of several
tiers of followings. Different from the American studies of
community power structure, this dyadic, clientelist model
stresses the cultural and social factors in fabricating the
nature of local politics and emphasizes the interdependency
between the leaders and followers. In Scott's study of the
political changes in Southeast Asia (1976), he further delineated
the impact of national political changes in shaping the local
political arenas. The clientelist models provide insights in
clarifying the question of the unity of elites through their
focuses on factionalism which is occasioned by these
particularistic dyadic political relationships as well as
directing the attention to depicting the micro-foundation of the
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dynamics rather than only describing the political power
structure in local politics. In Gallin's study of a Taiwan
village (1968), he discovered that the interelite competitions,
which involved intense political recruitment and alignments on
the basis of elites' personal, kinship and friendship ties, had
fragmented the original village solidarity. Worse still, the
resultant factionalism even made the customary means for
resolving local-level conflict become increasingly inadequate and
often led many local conflict go unresolved. In another
anthropological study of Taiwan's local politics, Jacobs (1980)
unveiled that one of the motivation behind those Chinese local
leaders to pursue some local offices, which actually have no
voice in policy-making and not much in policy implementation, are
their indulged cultural values of `face' or prestige and
community solidarity. In achieving these symbolic values, they
even spent far more than any they could get from a term in
office. Above all, even though these patron-client studies have a
different line to explore the nature and dynamic of the local
political system, they can really compensate the inadequacies of
the former two lines of studies which predominantly focus on
Western democracies and seldom take account of the cultural
factors.
As mentioned before, many community politics studies ignore
the importance of the role of the state. Notwithstanding, as the
intervention of the state becomes more and more important in
delivering public services, the local politics becomes
increasingly affected by the central policies. Thus any
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theoretical exploration should not neglect the significant role
played by the central government. Lineberry (1971) noted that
there were two distinct approaches in studying the community
politics: the macro and the micro approaches. Macro-analysis
emphasizes the dependent and the peripheral nature of the
community on the central government and treats communities as a
unit of the wider political system. Conversely, micro-analysis
stresses the independent nature of communities and focuses on
studying the subcommunity units. The macro-approaches concentrate
on: 1. the impacts of the central public policies on the
communities 2. the inter-community political integration 3. the
linkages between local and central government, as well as the
penetration of the central government and the local reforms and
changes induced accordingly 4. the differences among the
communities in mobilizing some public resources in achieving
their community goals. The micro-approaches on the other hand
focus on: 1. the political participation within the communities
2. the interest-brokerage of the local political organizations
with the local authority 3. the ways of some community political
actors to influence other actors in pursuing their own goals. In
dealing with the central-local relationship, Tarrow (1977)
described two kinds of coalitions may be formed with the local
communities: the .populist alliance in which the central
government aim at get supports from the whole local mass instead
of some specific local groups and the productive alliance in
which the national elites align with the most productive local
groups which can be most likely to generate a favorable condition
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for them to carry out their intended public policies. Using these
two dimensions of coalition and combining with the strength of
the institutional linkages between the central and the local
government, Tarrow constructed a fourfold typology of policy
impacts on the local communities:
Table 3. Four Types of Policy Impact
Institutional Linkages
Strong Weak
Elite Populist Redistributive Clientelistic
Coalitional
Strategy Productive Dirigiste Extractive
The redistributive policy impact is characterized by the
efforts paid by the state to compensate the adverse effects
caused by the intrusion and extraction of the national economy.
The extractive policy impact is marked by the incapability of the
state to withhold the permeation of the markets which inducing
some bad effects on the local communities. The dirigiste one is
skeletonized by the regulation of a strong state which limits the
worst extractions of the markets through selective' regional aids
and urban policies. Lastly, the clientelistic policy impact is
caused by a less efficiently administered political system which
is highly susceptible to local political influence on both policy
transmission and implementation. In both redistributive and
extractive political systems, the local political groups are
unnecessary or unable to affect the central policies, but in the
dirigiste political system, the local politicians can capture
state resources through a strategy of administrative activism and
in the clientelistic political system, they can increase their
communities' share of public resources through political
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entrepreneurship. The political activism results the local
politicians to be elitist and favorable to status quo while the
political entrepreneurship makes them to be more resident-
oriented and more willing to challenge the existing institutions.
Moreover, under the clientelistic political system, there is a
higher level of local policy conflicts than that of the dirigiste
political system due to the dissimilarity of the strategies of
the local politicians. Above all, Tarrow well illustrated how the
national political structure mold the patterns of the local
politics and directed the study of community politics toward a
more macro-analysis.5
B. Research Problems
The HK political system was often described as an
authoritarian regime in which the government bureaucracy
monopolized all the political power. The HK political power
5. Tarrow contrasted Italy and France to illustrate his points.
He showed that the well integrated administrative system and the
productive vertical alliance in France directed the mayor's
attention primarily toward the state apparatus and constrained
their activities mainly orientating toward developing contacts in
the administration. However, the diffuse bureaucratic system and
the populistic vertical ruling coalition in Italy induced more
citizen participation and directed mayors' energy and political
credit in order to gain policy benefits that ought to be routine.
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structure was a monolithic one with a small group of interlocked
business and pro-government elites controlled two major
decision-making bodies: the ExCo and LegCo. In a pioneer work of
Tang (1973), he found that the unofficials in the LegCo were
mostly the businessmen. They were closely connected with each
others directly or indirectly through interlocking of
directorship in a number of leading business corporations. Davies
(1977:68-9) also detected that a relatively small, self-contained
power elites controls the policy process. These power elites were
bounded by a basic similarity of attitudes which was produced by:
1. a commonalty of interest in a small number of major financial
and business concerns at the board level 2. a pattern of common
membership in a small number of exclusive recreational clubs 3.
living in relatively few exclusive residential areas and 4. a
shared involvement in numerous charitable organizations and their
public functioning. At the local level, although there were
numerous consultative and advisory broads established in order
to articulate the grassroot needs, the government officials still
dominated in all decision-making processes. The recruitment
processes were managed in the hand of the government.
Consequently, all the recruited members were pro-government or
indeed without any grassroot supports. As King (1975) described
the prime aim of the whole local consultative networks was-to use
the administrative means to absorb all the possible threats to
her governance. Nevertheless, 1966 and 1967 riots demonstrated
that there was a communication gap between the mass and the
government. This made the government recognized that the society
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had changed, the locally born generations, especially the
educated ones, increasingly demanded the government to do more.
As the people became better off, they no longer worried about
the subsistence living, rather they wanted to increase the
standard of living. They wanted more municipal facilities,
better living environment, convenient transportation system,
more social security and more educational opportunities etc..
All these required the involvement of the government because
there were no other organizations could have enough resources
to provide such kinds of nonprofitable activities. Along the
developmental course of Hong Kong, the society could no longer
resolved these problems by private means, instead, global
solutions involving substantial resource investments and coordi-
nation initiated by the government were needed. The riots also
made the government know that the traditional intermediate
organizations were not well functioned. This recognition
propelled the government to decentralize her administration
and delegate some of her resources as well as authority to
some trustful and relatively autonomous social groups. In
the 70s, the government did led out some kind of top-down
administrative reforms and encourage the establishment of local
residents' organizations. In order to substitute the
ineffective traditional intermediate organizations, the govern-
ment attempted to introduce the City District Office Scheme and
complemented by the Mutual Aid Committees Movement. The
establishment of MAC was' deliberately encouraged by the
government because she wanted to strengthen the mechanism of
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collecting information for formulating responsive policies and
pacifying community conflicts without politicizing the
society. Nevertheless, the government imposed too many
restrictions on the MAC for fearing them turning into political
groups which were out of the control, at last, the MAC movement
terminated without any direct contribution in bridging the
communication gap. Indeed, from the post-war period till now, all
the government-sponsored organizations hardly bridged the gap
between the mass and the government,6 this failure was
predominately due to the inherent restrictive nature of the top-
down administrative reforms. Besides these kinds of top-down
encouragement of establishing residents' organizations, there
6. For the decline of these residents' organizations, see Lau
1981, C.B. Leung 1982 and 1986.
25
were a small number of self-aware pressure groups, attempted to
arouse citizens' political consciousness of democracy and fight
for the residents interests in a bottom-up direction.
Notwithstanding, the social actions carried out by these pressure
groups were highly diffused, unorganized and issue-oriented
grievance articulated locally, they by no means become any
serious challenges to the government, nor raising a sense of
citizenship among the political apathetic mass. However, an
additional opportunity for the local democracy was foreseen when
the 1997 issue invoked another top-down political reform which
was first started at the local level. Moreover, the possibility
of success seemed to be further raised by a bottom-up thrust
because the political reform in turn fostered a territory-wide
7. The term `pressure group' has a much narrow connotation than
what commonly referred by other scholars. In HK political
context, pressure groups are often referred to those neighborhood
or specific-issue organizations which are monitored secretly by
the government's Standing Committee on Pressure Groups. These
organizations often adopted a unconventional influence tactics
and a confrontational posture to challenge government's
authority. The secret establishment of the Standing Committee On
Pressure Groups was disclosed by a journalist Duncan Campbell,
see his A Secret Plan for Dictatorship in Newstateman Vol.
2595. For a clear definition of pressure group in HK context, see
also Lui (forthcoming), Cheng's Pressure Groups under HK
Political System. (all in Chinese)
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democratic movement which was previously embarked by the pressure
groups in a fragmented manner.
In this study, three factors are considered in shaping the
nature of the HK local politics: the top-down political and
administrative reforms of the government, the bottom-up
democratic movement, and the nature of the community. The first
factor includes the non-political administrative reconstruction
of the services-delivery system, as well as the political reforms
of introducing the District Board and Regional Council elections.
The second factor mainly refers to the effects exerted by the
local as well as the territory pressure groups in forging the
nature and dynamic of the local political system. The last factor
mainly attributes to the degree of urbanization, the political
attitudes of the residents, and the seriousness and the scope of
social problems encountered by the community residents. Apart
from these external factors, the nature of the elites themselves
as well as the interelite relationships are also crucial in
molding the local political system. The primary goal of this
study is to show how these external factors jointly shape the
elite structure as well as the elite-mass relationships and which
in turn shape the nature of the local political system. The elite
structure mainly refers to the composition of the elites
themselves and* the interelite relationships including their power,
differentiation as well as their interactions. Tuen Mun is
deliberately selected for this study because it experiences all
the above three external processes which alter its local
political nature. Since Tuen Mun is a deliberately built new town
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in the New Territories, it not only comes across with a
developing course in which urbanization, rise and fall of social
problems, and changing residents' political consciousness, but
also, it experienced the reconstruction of the administrative
system as well as the political reforms which encountered by all
the district in HK. Moreover, Tuen Mun is well known of its
penetration by the pressure groups, so it is well qualified for
this study. Since the above three determining processes do not
occur at the same time, in order to explore the full dynamic of
changes contributed by these three processes, a historical and
descriptive approach is employed. The questions below will be
attempted to explore thoroughly:
1. How did the reconstruction of administrative system, the
urbanization process and government's development programs
affect the political power of the rural leaders, the leader-
residents relationship and the composition of the local elites?
2. How did the political reforms and the penetration of the HK
democratic movement as well as the Tuen Mun social problems give
rise to the pressure groups?
3. How did the challenge of the pressure groups foster a change
of the traditional elites?
4. After the adaptation of the traditional elites to the new




Data for this study are collected from divergent sources.
The major sources are collected from the in-depth interviews of
24 informants in whom 7 of them are interviewed twice for
clarifying further questions. Each interview is about two and a
half hours to three hours. Among the 24 informants, 16 of them
are elected DB members, 3 are appointed DB members, 3 comes from
local pressure groups, 1 is the staff'of the Joint DB members
Office, and 1 is an active local resident who was formerly a
founder of a local pressure group. The interviews are
semi-structured, while some leading questions are posited, but
some of the questions are asked immediately after the informants
posed a problem which was not recognized beforehand. All these
questions are aimed to collect the histories of development of
the political groups or organizations under concerned and attempt
to figure out the elite-mass as well as the interelite
relationships. The questions can be divided into three
categories: the first concerning their relationships with the
residents, other factions members, and the government officials
the second dealing with their comments on their own group as well
as the other groups behaviors and mentalities the third asking
their opinions on the political development of Tuen Mun and Hong
Kong as a whole. The second sources are the reports and
researches done by some scholars, voluntary associations and
local residents' organizations. The third sources come from the
news concerning Tuen Mun social and political affairs published
in the press, especially a local press, Tuen Mun Star. The fourth
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sources are the minutes of the Tuen Mun DB meetings, the period
covered is from April of 1982 to December of 1988. The fifth
sources are the propagation materials of the DB and RC elections
candidates. All these news, minutes and propagation materials
help to figure out the political alignment among the elites as
well as reveal the political strategies employed by them.
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II. An Historical Account of Politics in Tuen Mun
A. General Features of Politics in the New Territories
1. The Heung Yee Kuk and the Rural Committees
Before the urbanization, the New Territories, due to its
leased nature,' had been governed differently from the more
urbanized areas.2 In the urban areas, the governmental services
were organized in a bureaucratic manner and discharged through a
centralized and functionally departmentalized machinery. However,
I. Under the Convention of 1898, the New Territories were leases
to Britain for 99 years, however, under the Treaty of Nanking ir.
1842 and the Convention of Peking in 1860, the Hong Kong Island
and the southern part of the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters
Island were ceded in perpetuity.
2. This was confirmed by the former District Commissioner J.P.
Aserappa (1964:2), he said, Why in such a small Colony as Hong
Kong should there be two different types of administration....
The urban areas of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon were ceded tc
Great Britain in perpetuity, whereas the New Territories are
leased for a term of 99 years. When the Colony was first taken
over, it consisted mostly of barren and unproductive hillside
with only a few isolated settlements. But in the New Territories
the situation was quite different. When they were taken over,
there were about 100,000 people, living there in an established
society, occupying and farming their own land, and with their own
traditional customs and usages. This meant quite a different
approach.
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the New Territories was allowed an indirect rule in order to
cultivate harmonious relationship between the colonial regime and
the rural residents. Therefore, the government had appeared more
willing to listen to rural opinions and the government tried to
alleviate resistance in policy implementation by obtaining prior
consultation and understanding from the rural representatives.
Since the government granted a great autonomy to the rural
residents, the rural people were primarily organized along the
traditional Chinese style of paternalism. (Wong 1982:13-5)
Although, due to its colonial nature, the political power still
concentrated in the hand of the District Officer,3 there was a
formal system of rural representation to give advice to him. The
rural representation system is composed of three levels and it
is an exclusive system only comprising the `original
3. The District Officer acted as a semi-omnipotent viceroy in his
region. He would maintain law and order, arbitrate into civil
disputes and pass judgements on criminal affairs. (Wong 1982:14)
However, in the 70s, as the urbanization took place, most of the
functions of the District Officer had been losing to the central
government. He became a mere political broker rather than an
omnipotent viceroy, to coordinate rather than to command. For
detailed functions performed by the District Officer in the 70s,
see Miners, 1981:192-7.
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inhabitants'.4 The lowest tier consists of 900 representatives
who are elected or appointed according to local custom by the
heads of households in the 565 inhabited villages. Village
Representatives are organized into 27 Rural Committees which are
acting as the spokesmen for local public opinion, arbitrating in
clan and family disputes, promoting local welfare as well as
maintaining contact with the District Officer. The apex of the
rural representation system is the Heung Yee Kuk (normally
translated as Rural Consultative Council), which is found in
1926, and became a statutory advisory body in 1958.5 (Miners
1981:197-8) The election system of the Heung Yee Kuk is an
4. The original inhabitants are those who have come from the
provinces bordering on the south of the Yangtze river and made
their way to South China during -the time of the Southern Sung
Dynasty (1127-1278 A.D.) See James Hayes, 1962:78.
5. In 1957, there was a Heung Yee Kuk crisis, in which the Kuk
was splitted into two factions: the progressive and the
conservative camps. The conservative group came from the less
urbanized areas and they regarded the developmental policies of
the government was harmful to their benefits, so they manifested
an anti-development attitude. At that time, the Government
suddenly withdrew the recognition of the Kuk's status and
declared it as illegal. After its strong objections and
negotiations with the Government, the Government introduced the
Heung Yee Kuk Bill and gave a legal status to it. For details,
see Kuan and Lau 1981:80-83, and Lee 1983, 1984.
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indirect one: the villagers (based on a franchise which includes
property ownership and native status or at least long-term
residence in the village) elect their representatives, who in
turn elect-the rural committee chairmen, who in turn elect the
Full Council of the Kuk, who in turn elect the Kuk's Executive
Committee which is the real power center. Yet, at the community
level, members of the Rural Committee, i.e. the village
representatives, are the most important political figures. One
may ask who these local leaders are. Associated with the
traditional Imperial China, the scholar-gentry or the
gentry-elders are expected to be the local leaders in the New
Territories. Nevertheless, as many researchers had learned that
this type of gentry lost power or died in the course of British
rule. Instead, a new type of leaders rose and replaced these
traditional gentry due to their wealth, leadership ability,
political skills and outside connections. (Freedman, 1976:210-3,
1966:10 Potter, 1969:15-6) Then, what were the political
relationships among the Government, the villagers and these new
local leaders? A patron-client model may be found fruitful to
explain the phenomena.
2. The Patron-Client Political Relationships
According to Eisenstadt and Roniger (1981:276-7), the major
analytical characteristics of patron-client relations are
1. They are usually particularistic, diffuse, and with whole
person relationships rather than explicit, impersonal-contract
bonds being the base of the interactions. (Scott 1976:125) By
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particularistic, it means the incumbents of the relationship act
towards one another in terms of their respective personal
properties and not in terms of general universal categories.
(Eisenstadt 1956:96)
2. The patron-client interaction is a kind of simultaneous
exchange of instrumental, economic and political resources on the
one hand, the promises of solidarity and loyalty on the other.
3. The exchange is usually effected by a package-deal, neither
resource can be exchanged separately but only in a combination
that includes both types.
4. Ideally, a strong element of unconditionality, and a long-
range credit and obligations are built into these relations. They
are usually fully institutionalized, sanctioned by some of the
most important and severe rituals. (Ibid)
5. The solidarity involved in these relations is often closely
related to conceptions of personal identity, especially of
personal honor and obligations, and personal spiritual
attachment existing between patrons and clients. The face-to-
face, personal quality of the relationship and the continuing
pattern of reciprocity that establishes and solidifies a
patron-client bond often create trust and affection between the
partners. (Scott 1976:126)
6. The relations established are not fully legal or contractual,
but based on more informal-understandings.-
7. However, in spite of the seemingly binding and long-range
endurance, patron-client relations are entered into voluntarily,
and hence can be abandoned voluntarily. However, unlike many
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other voluntary, contractual relations, they are not anonymous,
but very personal and intimate. (Eisenstadt 1956:96)
8. These relations are undertaken between individuals or
networks of individuals in a vertical fashion rather than between
horizontally organized corporate groups.
9. Finally, they are based on very strong elements of inequality
and power differences. There is an imbalance in exchange between
the two partners which expresses and reflects the disparity in
their relative wealth, power, and status.
After the Second World War, as mentioned before, the
District Officer was granted a lot of power to deal with the
villagers, however he often used his power with close cooperation
with the local leaders. Moreover, since the local leaders were
always the wealthy persons, they did a lot of charitable works.
These charitable public works made them achieved a very high
status and prestige among the villagers as well as the
recognition of their leadership by the District Officers. As
described by Johnson (1977:117),
None of the leaders who rank high are poor and some
are very wealthy indeed... They are recognized as
leaders not because of the influence they wield through
some powerful associational office but because they are
active in charitable affairs.
Hence, before becoming a village representative, the leader
had to spend both time and, especially, money to his road to
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succeed.6 Not only through engaging in charitable public works,
the leaders frequently used their wealth to buy elections. As
Potter commented that,
Although the election of local leaders is
theoretically by democratic methods, actually many
elections are decided by bribery or by voting strictly
according to kinship lines. (Potter 1969:17)
uonsiaering orioery, actual money transfers may not be the
only way to obtain the vote needed, many other forms of bribery
could have the similar effects, including organizing some feasts
or leisure activities, such as opera, to the villagers well
before the election, spending money to build some facilities like
repairing the foot-path or temple, and giving the villagers some
advantages in business or land rent. After attaining the office
of village representative, the leader can further his power base
through being a mediator between the rural population and the
Government, or more specific, the District Officer. Being the
formal political channels with the District Officer, the leaders
could help the villagers resolve their problems involving the
government. As Freedman noted,
They (village representatives) are not a sole channel
through which relations between the villagers and the
Administration flow, for any individual is free to
approach the District Office or one of its staff in the
6 It was usually found that the wealthiest persons gained the
highest positions, especially the posts -of Rural Committee
chairmen and vice-chairmen, where the incumbents tended to be the
heads of powerful lineages, landlords and wealthy businessmen.
(Young, 1974:31)
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field, and many exercise this right freely, especially
in areas where communications are good. But a
villager's claim on the attention of officials is
presumably strengthened when he has his Representative
(his headman from his point of view) to speak for him,
and from this position the Village Representative is
able to extract a power advantage which in reality
raises him above the status of a mere mouthpiece for
his constituency. (1976:211)
As a result, the leaders gave an impression of being very
busy men, running constantly to District Office, mediating
between the Administration and their constituents, and
consulting with one another. Accordingly, Freedmen concluded
that power came to the village representative from the
position he enjoyed vis-a-vis the outside world. (Freedmen
1976:212) From these brief descriptions, it can been seen that
the traditional New Territories politics is typically a kind of
clientelist one. The relations between the local leaders and the
villagers are particularistic and diffuse. Being born and grew
within the same region, the leaders had established close
relationships with the villagers by kinship, tenancy, friendship,
past exchanges of services, the past tie of their ancestors, and
previous cooperations. Moreover, since the leaders were rich and
had outside connection, while the villagers were often relatively
poor and less competent in dealing with the government officials
because of their lower educational level and inferiority feeling
toward the officials, the leaders could exchange their loyalty,
support, respect and vote with material, financial and political
assistance. Their relationships are whole-person and
non-contractual in nature, and their exchanges were arranged in
a package-deal: the leaders would help the villagers in every
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occasions as far as possible, while the villagers in turn would
support the leaders whenever they asked them. These kinds of
particularistic and whole-person exchanges cultivated a rather
long-range leader-villager relationships. Mutual obligations and
credits were well established, thus the leaders could hold an
office for a very long time. As observed by Hayes (1980:64), in
the villages, there were often only one candidate, therefore,
they usually emerged without election and where elections were
held, mainly in the market towns, the same men often held office
for years on end. Though there was a formal procedure to electing
the village representatives, the villagers vote for the leaders
were not out of any sense of citizenship or democratic deed, they
voted for the leaders totally out of the informal understanding
based on the experience of previous exchanges. It should also be
noted that their relations were based on inequality of wealth,
power and status. The leaders were often much richer, having more
political power and higher prestige than the ordinary village
people. This kind of vertical relationship enabled the local
leaders to command or even sanction their followers. However,
since both the villagers and the leaders entered into this kind
of relationships voluntarily, thus the leaders could not
absolutely disregard the demands of the villagers, which strongly
against the Government's will, though one of his major power
source was come from the recognition of the government. Thus, the
leaders had to maneuver within the limits of what they assessed
village wishes and demands to be, even took a stand which was not
the one he might himself stick to.
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In sum, the leaders acted as the patrons who provided the
material needs and political whenever the villagers requested,
while the villagers played as the clients, in return they gave
loyalty and political supports to the leaders. Yet, the existence
of these patron-client relations depended upon the goodwill and
the recognition of the District Officers. Why were the District
Officers so sympathetic with the leaders? This was mainly due to
the special leased status of the New Territories and the
traditional British colonial practice. Since the villagers were
relatively more organized through lineage ties and traditional
customs than the urban areas, thus they were more vulnerable to
collective actions to against some policies detrimental to their
interests.? Therefore, for the sake of the good of the colony as
a whole, the government took great care of their interests when
launching out new policies and respected the opinions of the
7 The Heung Yee Kuk started as a pressure group in defending
rural interests against any possible government encroachment.
(Lee 1984:165-8) After the Kuk institutionalized into a powerful
voluntary association, she still gave a lot of pressure to the
government in order to fight for the rural interests. For
instance, in one dispute, some villagers even temporarily halted
work on the construction of catchwater channels for the new Tai
Lam Chung reservoir and made the colony suffer from a severe
water shortage. (Miners 1981:199) For more examples, see Miners
1981:199-200.
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local leaders because they were not only the village heads but
also helping the District Officers to maintain the law and
order, the welfare of the villages as well as resolving the
conflicts between the Government and the villagers.g
Furthermore, being afraid of increasing the hostility of the
Chinese against the alien foreign ruling, the colonial
government's policies were based upon the principles of
maximizing harmony and cooperation on one hand and minimizing
friction and obstruction on the other. Since the Anglo-Chinese
cooperation was founded on mutual explanations and persuasion and
mutual respect as well, so the government, wherever possible,
8. The helpfulness of the local leaders in public welfare was
illustrated by a former District Officer, James Hayes, It was
these men who took offers of cement, sand, aggregate, piping, old
railway tracks and steel bars,... with the help of village
labor, converted them into a steadily growing list of all-weather
paths and tracks, small bridges, irrigation bumps, water intakes
and the like.... Education was another field of joint efforts.
(Hayes 1980:65) The former District Commissioner also praised the
village representatives in settling disputes, in preparing the
way for public works schemes, payment of compensation for land or
crops and the help given at the time of typhoons or other
emergencies. (Aserappa 1964:7)
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acts in accordance with the Chinese wishes and customs.9 Where
compromise was impossible, the Government tried not to move too
far in advance of Chinese public opinion. (Mills 1970:380-1)
Notwithstanding, as urbanization took place, the need of the
establishment of an effective administrative system, like that in
the urban areas, made the rural areas expose to external
political power. Since the role of the District Officer had
changed, the civil servants in the new administrative system
tended to discharge their duties according to professional
standards and with territory-wide interests in mind, so they did
not show any sympathy with the rural leaders as the District
Officer. (Kuan and Lau 1981b:75) Still, as urbanization and
industrialization took place, more and more outsiders migrated
into the New Territories, all these signified the power of the
native local leaders being slashed. From a legal point of view,
the Kuk is supposed to advise the Government in affairs which
would affect all people of New Territories, but its restrictive
system of election, which excludes the outsiders either from
9. The most noticeable example is the problem of fun-la.- shui, as
the Colonial Secretary said in his speech in the budget debate of
1962: If there is an acre of land in the New Territories that is
entirely free from traditional, private, physical, contingent,
moral or pre-emptive disability, it is probably so imbued with
the mystic properties of fung shui that the District Commissioner
would not dare to lift his hand against it. (quoted in Aserappa
1964:4-5)
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being eligible to vote or competing in the election, made it
hardly a true representative body. (Kuan and Lau 1981a:171) If
the Kuk mainly mattered with the benefits of the original
inhabitants, could the new immigrants organize themselves to
challenge the authority of the native leaders? According to
Johnson's study on Tsuen Wan (1977), he found that there were two
political forces: one was organized by the original inhabitant
and the other was formed by the outsiders. Nonetheless, the
outsider leadership could not effectively crosscut the various
interests due to their sectional nature,'° nor were there any
formal structures, like the Rural Committee, in which the
outsiders could work through. On the contrary, the native
leadership was strong because the problems of its constituency
were unambiguous and its solidarity was considerable- In
addition, seeing the outsider leadership was overwhelmingly in
the middle class, but majority of the outsiders were working
class people, they were arduous to establish close interpersonal
relationships like those of the native leadership. Consequently,
the outsider leadership hardly gained enough support to challenge
10, The outsiders came from different parts of Mainland China, so
they were diverse in language, culture and experience.
11, The solidarity within the native communities was mainly due
to their close interpersonal relationship, which were grounded on
four culturally defined factors: social roles, personal
attributes, etiquette and sentiment. For details, see Young,
1974:44-83.
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the native political force. Yet, this did imply the legitimacy of
the native leaders of representing the rural population was being
eroded. Worse still, the power base of the native leaders was
further weakened because there was a trend of the villagers to
seek outside employment and doing outside business led many of
the to be indifferent to village affairs. 12 Fortunately, politics
in the village suddenly revived as the government carried out a
planned development program to relieve the overcrowdedness in
the urban areas.13 This intensive planned development program
gave a chance of resuscitation of rural leadership. Whereas the
successful execution of the plan depended upon the acquiescence
of the original inhabitants for expediting the processes of land
12. Watson (1985:142-55) gave a clear picture of how the economic
changes had taken place in the villages: the emergence people
working outside the villages as wage workers, policemen, or
shopkeepers even some villagers emigrated to foreign countries.
As a result, the Rural Committee did not have much significance
for ordinary workers.
13, According to a speech by the former Secretary for the New
Territories, the main impetus for the development program came
from the policy objective declared by the Government in 1972 to
rehouse by the middle of 1980s, some 1.5 million Hong Kong people
who were then inadequately housed. So the public housing program
was integrated into programs for the development of new towns,
which would provide all the necessary facilities for an improved
living and working environment. (Akers-Jones 1980:2)
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requisition and clearance, the government had to rely on the
cooperation of the rural leadership to act as a mediator tc
resolve the possible conflicts in the course of development
because the rural leaders still possess of some ritual anc
political power among the villagers. By acting as brokers betweer
the government and the villagers, the rural leaders were
benefited with administrative convenience, better terms of
compensations in case of land resumption as well as information
on development priorities and implementation plans which had
crucial importance in the future realization of profits.
Moreover, the leaders could also use these advantages to further
their power base and manipulate their mediational role to gain
supports from both the Government and the villagers. In addition,
the general attitude of governmental policy toward the New
Territories was one of compromise and concession, so the rural
leaders could always employ demands made under the excuse of
damages inflicted on traditional, symbolic, or ritualistic values
to increase their bargaining power. (Kuan and Lau 1981b:83-4) So
Johnson concluded that so long as the native leaders have access
to their traditional facility, land, they would maintain their
hegemony of the channels of influence. (Johnson 1977:124)
Regardless of the government, who had the ultimate decision
power, the members of the Heung Yee Kuk and the Rural Committees
comprised the political structure in the New Territories before
the 80s.
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3. The Administrative Reform
In 1977, the Government set up the District Advisory
Boards14 and regionalized some governmental services.'s The aim
was to strengthen the administrative structure in the New
Territories so as to deal with the problems caused by the rapid
increases in population.16 To the native local leaders, the
District Advisory Board represented a serious threat to their
authority and privilege, so in the beginning the Kuk strongly
objected this proposal.17 Later, they were softened and instead
urged the government to consult them before any appointments of
14. The functions of the District Advisory Boards were to advise
on the general well-being of the inhabitants of the district, on
the adequacy and priorities of the Public Works program, and on
the use of funds for minor environmental improvements and the
promotion of recreational and cultural activities.
15. The major government departments involved were Public Works,
Education, Medical and Health, Transport, Housing Authority,
Urban Services, Fire Services, Royal Hong Kong Police, Social
Welfare and Labor Departments. They all had representatives on a
District Management Committee chaired by the District Officer.
16, Ian Scott (1982:666-73) provided a detail of how the
government's strategy to deal with the development of the New
Town: involving administrative reorganization, increasing the
political participation, and providing support staff for
community organizations.
17. For the reasons put forth against the establishment of the
Advisory Board, see Kuan and Lau, 1981a:185-6.
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the Board members were made. They also asked the government to
include the chairman as well as the vice-chairmen of the Rural
Committees on all Boards, but the Government did not accept these
suggestions. (Miners 1981:202) However, the rural interests had
not been suppressed since they were still heavily represented in
the Boards so that a transitional period was available to work
things through. The new administrative setup did have a
significant implication to the political structure of the New
Territories, as Kuan and Lau remarked that,
What it signifies is.... a new phase in the
relationship between the original inhabitants' and the
outsiders.... the original inhabitants' and their
leaders have been driven into a defensive position,
which forces them to decide afresh their relationship
with the newcomers and their elites. Their former
attitudes of indifference, ignorance, or downright
rejection will no longer suffice, as in an urbanizing
New Territories they have to cooperate in one way or
another with the outsiders and to share in the
facilities and services... Besides they constitute only
a numerically insignificant minority in the new urban
centers, and they have no way to seclude themselves
from the political presence of their one-time
`outsider' neighbors. (1981b:188)
In an opinion survey conauctea among unotticial members of
the eight New Territories Advisory Boards in 1981, Cheng found
that the attitudes of them did not reveal any significant pattern
of confrontation between unofficials representing the new
residents and those representing the `original inhabitants'.
Since the leaders who were appointed usually belonged to the pro-
development pro-government group, they were usually reluctant to
oppose the government because they are more susceptible to the
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government's strategy of selective incentive dispensation.18 In
addition, the rural leaders had no reason for confrontation as
the official and the new residents leaders usually adopted a low
profile and demonstrated considerable respect to their opinions.
Furthermore, many of the other unofficials were not new town
residents,19 being without constituency to represent and because
of their expertise, their opinions were generally respected by
both officials and the rural leaders. (Cheng 1984:287-94)
In 1981, the District Advisory Board was renamed as the
District Board and the membership was enlarged by the addition of
elected unofficials based on an universal adult suffrage. The
rural leaders were fully aware the importance of these elected
posts, so they actively involved in the 1982 District Board
election.
18. The government could distribute the Land Exchange
Entitlement in compensation for land surrendered, advance
information on development plans, right to private development
and other resources controlled by the government in a selective
manner to reward those favorable to the government and punish
those against the government.
19. Many of them were university lectures, professionals, social
workers and headmasters of secondary schools.
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From the following tables, 20 the performance of the original
inhabitant can be grasped:
Table 4a
Breakdown of Candidates by Background in the New Territories
DB Election
Candidate
Total No. Rural Background(%) No rural Background(%)
Shatin 15 6 9(40) (60)
Sai Kung 15 9 6(60) (40)
Tsuen Wan 36 6 30(17) (83)
Tuen Mun 20 16 4(80) (20)
Yuen Long 27 18 9(67) (33)
North 22 11 11(50) (50)
Tai Po 22 20 2(91) (9)
.Island 17 9 8(53) (47)
Total 174 95 79(55) (45)
Table 4b
Breakdown of Elected Candidates by Background in the New
Territories DB Election
Elected Candidates
Total No.,Rural Background(%) No rural Background(%)
Shatin 8 3 5(38) (63)
Sai Kung 5 3 2(60) (40)
Tsuen Wan 10 1 9(10) (90)
Tuen Mun 8 7 1(88) (12)
6 3Yuen Long 3(50) (50)
North 6 4 2(67) (33)
7Tai Po 5 2(71) (29)
Island 6 6 0(100) (0)
Total 56 32 (43)24(57)
200 The data are obtained from Lau and Kuan, 1983:15. Among 56
elected candidates with rural background, only 14 of them have
formal affiliation with the Heung Yee Kuk, others had close
relations with it. For=details, compare=-the table 3 and 4 in Lau
and Kuan, 1983:14-5.
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From these two tables, it is clear that the rural leaders
did well in the election. They held 57% of the total seats in the
New Territories. However, in the more urban districts such as
Shatin and Tsuen Wan, the rural forces did not enjoy any
advantage. Though the Heung Yee Kuk becoming more irrelevant to
the government as more and more urban immigrants moved into the
New Territories, the relative success of the Rural Committee
candidates really encouraged a number of them to compete in the
following elections. Hence, Cheng told us that it should not
lightly dismiss the influence of the traditional leaders,
Many of them have amassed considerable wealth.... They
also enjoy the assistance of well educated family
members, and the services of lawyers and other
professionals are readily available. These factors
definitely contributed to their success in the first
District Board elections.... These traditional rural
leaders can probably assess their influence more
intelligently and are more willing to compromise. The
government is therefore likely to appoint them.... In
contrast, the residents in the new towns... lack the
organization, the wealth and the political skills.
(Cheng 1984:299)
More significantly, the initial success of the rural leaders
gave an illusion that their traditional ways of mobilizing
village votes through interpersonal relationships proved to be
effective even in some new town public housing estates. In order
to ensure their seats in the DBs (District Boards), they extended
their patronage networks through sponsoring the MACs (Mutual Aid
Committees) and some voluntary associations to provide recreation
and amenities. Similar to their practices in the village, they
donated money to the MACs to organized picnics, feasts and
gods-worshiping ceremonies. They also gave money to build some
public facilities like schools and parks as well as organized
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district-wide activities such as the dragon-boat race,
celebrations in the Lunar New Year and other Festivals. Equally
important, from the previous experience of cooperating with the
government, they still thought that their pro-government
attitudes could further secure their seats. As a result, they
continued these traditional practices in the 1985 DB and 1986
Regional Council21 elections. But this time, the rural leaders
encountered with a great despair in the new towns. Many of their
candidates failed and the pressure groups members took a number
of seats. This urged the rural leaders to reflect on their
failure and sought change to regain the power. The changes taken
by the rural leaders will be fully discussed in the chapter 4
with an illustration of Tuen Mun.
21 Regional Council was established in 1986, it performs
functions similar to those of the Urban Council in Kowloon and
the Hong Kong Island.
B. The Tuen Mun Political Structure
1. The Rural Tuen Mun
Same as other rural districts, Tuen , Mun was originally
dominated by the Tuen Mun Rural Committee22 before the mid-70s.
Before the 1949, the original inhabitants were the only residents
in Tuen Mun, but in 1950, an influx of refugees occurred. Since
the original inhabitant maintained a sense of cultural
superiority toward these outsiders, conflicts frequently arose.
Being a heterogeneous group, the outsiders were politically
unorganized, thus when they had troubles with the original
inhabitants, they would seek helps from the rural leaders. In
return, they would reward the leaders with gifts or favors. The
political dependence of the outsiders on the leaders was further
reinforced by their administrative dependence on them.23
Consequently, the outsiders highly respected the leaders. In
other words, the leaders acted as patrons to the outsiders by
giving them protection against the incursions of the original
22, The Tuen Mun Rural Committee was formerly called the Tuen Mun
Heung Kai Fong Office. It was made up of 29 villages with a
population of more than 30,000 in 1952. One year later, in
response to the instruction of the New Territories
Administration, the office expanded to accommodate
representatives from the 29 local villages and renamed as the
Tuen Mun Rural Committee. (Sit and Birch 1982:61)
23. The outsiders depended on the leaders to obtain a permit to
cultivate on the Crown land.- (Chau 1979:20)
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inhabitants and helping them contact with the District Office.
However, from the 60s to mid 70s, the native leaders encountered
sudden rise and fall of power. As more and more original
inhabitants had employment away from the villages, being employed
in the factories in nearby Tsuen Wan, working in the Public Work
Department or Royal Police Force or going abroad to be employed
in Chinese restaurants (Chau 1979:22), they became less
interested in the rural affairs. As a result, the power of the
native leaders seemed to be eroded. In addition, the leaders'
power was further weakened because of the decline of their
patronage resources. Firstly, the internal mediation power of
them had been undermined by the decrease in quarrel between
outsiders and native villagers together with the efficiency of
the Police Force. Secondly, as the outsiders became more and more
organized than before, they had their own consultative network
with the District Officer, the brokerage role of the native
leaders was again lowered. Thirdly, since Tuen Mun was a target
of New Town development, most of the land were drawn into the
developmental plan, so temporary land-use permits were no longer
issued. This made the native leaders lost one of the most useful
resource which they once manipulated to dispense among the
outsiders. Fourthly, as the outsiders, unlike the original
inhabitant, had no private land to sell, they were-the victims
rather than the beneficiaries so they strongly opposed the
development plan. Being original inhabitants themselves, the
leaders surely sided with the plan, this broke up the original
patron-client relations. (Chau 1979:63-9) After all, facing these
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negative conditions, the native leaders could still restore their
power with the assistance of the government. In spite of the
development plan making the native leaders lose support from the
outsiders, it did strengthen the power of their leaders. On one
hand, government's policies of giving favors to the
pro-development groups secured the native leaders' position
through increasing their patronage power, including emphasizing
their representative roles and giving them information to
dispense among the villagers. On the other hand, since the
representative role of the native leaders were deliberately
emphasized by the government, some of the outsiders who felt that
the government would not receded eventually would return to the
leaders for bargaining better terms of compensation. Therefore,
the government not only make the local leaders act as a buffer
between the government and the original inhabitants, but also
used them to split the outsiders in order to lower the
possibility for the outsiders to organize any collective actions.
The native leaders, in return, consolidated their leadership and
gained sizable material benefits from the information on
development priorities. From this point of view, the government
can be treated as the biggest patron, she gave material as well
as power resources to those who could help her to execute the
plan smoothly. The leaders.act both as the patrons of.the
villagers and the clients of the government. As the clients of
the government, they got resources from the government and helped
her to launch out the plan without serious disturbance as the
patrons of the villagers, the villagers had both instrumental
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ties as well as affective links with the leaders so they trusted
the leaders would bargain the best terms of compensation for
them. However, it should be noted that this kind of patron-client
relationship had changed from the one in the pre-development
period. At that time, the District Officers held all the
executive powers, their relationships with the leaders were quite
personal and intimate, but now they had only the coordinational
functions and most of their previous powers had returned to the
central government. Thus, instead of cultivating a
particularistic relationship with the District Officers, the
leaders now faced with a rather anonymous bureaucracy, even
though their relationship with the villagers had not changed. Now
the leaders seemed to only act as a broker for the government.
Yet, it should not simply regard the leaders only acquiring a
brokerage role between the government and the villagers. As
Scott (1977:126-7) reminded that the role of patron had to be
distinguished from such role of broker. The broker only served as
an intermediary to arrange an exchange or transfer between the
parties who were not in direct contact, a patron, on the
other hand, was part of a two-person exchange and operated
with resources he himself owned or directly controlled. Even
more, the broker did not specify the relative status of actor
to other transaction, while a patron was by definition of
superior rank to his client. Moreover, the concept of middleman
did not imply any personal relations between the patron and the
client nor the generalized exchanges out of the transaction
undertaken. Rather being an arbitrary chosen broker, the leaders
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were intentionally selected by the government because of their
prestige and commanding role in the villages. Since the leaders
actually performed both as the patrons of the villagers and
clients of the government, they had to weigh the cost and benefit
in fighting for the villagers' interests. More than the role of
the broker, they had to find out some minimum' common demands of
the villagers and saw whether these demands were acceptable by
the government. If these demands were considered as unreasonable
by the government, they had to skillfully persuade the villagers
to cut back their requests. If the villagers refused, the
leaders' goal was to prevent them from mobilizing against the
government and tried their best to convince both sides to make
concession. Thus, the transactions between the villagers and the
government could not be facilely proceeded through other
middlemen other than the rural leaders. Nonetheless, the vertical
power relationship among the three actors had not altered: the
government at the apex, the villagers at the bottom, and the
leaders in between them.
2. The New Town Development
During the mid-70s to the 80s, the population of Tuen Nun
grew rapidly due to the mass influx of urban immigrants.
According the Censuses, the population growth is presented as:
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Table 5
Population Growth in Tuen Mun





The urban immigrants made the population rise over ten times
than that of 1971. Since the original inhabitants had turned
from majority to insignificant minority, the representativeness
of the Tuen Mun Rural Committee became much questionable. In
response to this new challenge, the Tuen Mun rural leaders,
rather than only serving the original inhabitants, began to
change their attitude to serve the entire population of Tuen Mun.
Indeed, the Tuen` Mun rural elites have a more cosmopolitan
outlook and more experience to deal with the strangers than their
counterparts in other rural districts. The Tuen Mun Rural
Committee was the first one to open doors to the outsiders while
reluctance to admit outsiders was still prevalent among the
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original inhabitants.24 Besides, they even participated in
newcomers' organizational activities and willing to lend
political influence to the newcomers for defending or promoting
interests. Their accommodative attitudes made them not only
maintaining their vested interests, but also upgrading themselves
into legitimate leaders also of the outsiders. (Kuan and Lau
1981a:190) Though antagonisms between the leaders of the original
inhabitants and the outsiders were still there, this did not
prevent their cooperations because these conflicts were minor and
latent. More important, since the leaders of both parties were
mostly the wealthy businessmen, they had common commercial
interests. As the business and industrial activities had been
growing in substantial size and volume, this enhanced their
potentiality of cooperation on the one hand, and greatly reduced
their manifest opposition on the another. Hence, it was quite
often to find their common membership in some important local
chambers of commerce, merchants associations and community
24, For instance, in Sept., 1977, the Committee decided to allow
a newly established village consisting of outsiders to send its
representatives to the Committee, though they were not given the
right to vote. Later, the Committee decided to go one step
further and made a revision of its constitution to allow a
variety of interests and -parties to be represented. (Kuan and Lau
1981a:176f)
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organizations.25 Furthermore, since there was an gap between the
wealthy leaders and the relatively poor outsiders, the outsider
leaders indeed faced with a lack of grassroot supports, so they
had great difficulties not to cooperate with the rural leaders.
Moreover, the rural elites also extended their patronage to the
MACs of the public housing estates by donating money for them to
organize functions.26 Thus it could be easily found that the
rural leaders were often acknowledged as the honorary chairmen,
presidents, consultants or members in most MACs. Nevertheless,
the most successful illustration of the Tuen Mun rural elites in
adapting the new situation was the establishment of the Yan Oi
Tong. Yan Oi Tong was formerly a small village social
organization, later in accordance with the new strategy employed
by the rural elites, it was registered as a charitable corpor-
ation in 1977. Only up to 1986, in these nine time, Yan Oi Tong
had erected one medical center, two sport centers, one swimming
2 5. For examples, the Tuen Mun Chambers of Commerce, the Tuen Mun
Merchants Association in the New Territories, Tuen Mun Recreation
and Amenities Promotion Association, Yuen Long Jaycees and the
Yan Oi Tong. (these organizations are cited by my informants of
appointed DB members.)
26, According to J.L. Scott (1982:18f), some of the activities
held by the MACs are quite expensive, like the inauguration
ceremonies including a banquet, formal photography, and
commemorative gifts are estimated to cost from $20,000 to
$30,000. Thus outside donation is always needed.
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pool, one community hall, one secondary school, one primary
school and two kindergartens.27 Moreover, the rural leaders
coopted many outsider leaders into Yan Oi Tong by honoring them
as members, vice-chairmen or even chairman. Therefore, the
boundary between rural and outsider leadership became more and
more blurred and people even treated them as standing on the same
side.
Geared with this successful assimilation of the outsiders'
leadership, the 1982 DB election was monopolized by the rural
leaders. Among 19 candidates, 6 claimed themselves as village
leaders or aiming at promoting village affairs, and at least 5
had rural background or attachment with the Yan Oi Tong, 4 came
from the MACs or the tenants corporations and 4 independent
candidates.28 While only one non-rural background candidate was
elected, this might be due to his job of being a social worker.
Other 7 seats were all taken by the rural affiliated candidates.
Among 8 appointed unofficial DB members, 4 came from the Rural
27. For details of the erections and the services of Yan Oi Tong,
see Wah Kiu Yat Po, August 9, 1985, August 1, 1986 and March 3,
1988.
28. The information is obtained in South China Morning Post,
March 1,1982 and my observation. There were at least 11
candidates having the rural affiliations, but this number might
be underestimated because some MAC and independent candidates
might have rural background that were not cited in the newspaper
and out of my observation.
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Committee and other 4 had common memberships or commercial ties
with the native leaders.29 It is clear that up to 1982, the rural
force was hardly challenged. However, this kind of rural
monopolization of power had abruptly changed in the mid-80s and
some of the local power of Tuen Mun was seized by the emerging
new political groups. The consecutive chapter will explore the
changed political structure in details.
29. See the brief introduction of the Tuen Mun 82-85 DB members,
in The Hong Kona District Board'Directory (in Chinese), p.220-2.
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III. The Rise of the Local Pressure Groups
A. The Fall of the Traditional Force
1. Tuen Mun New Town Problems
In the early stage of the development of Tuen Mun New Town,
the new residents encountered great adaptive problems. According
to a survey study of the Tuen Mun residents in 1976-7 (Chan
1977), the researchers found that 33.5% of the respondents
commented the bad living and hygienic environment, and about
40.4% complained about the inadequacy of the medical facilities.
In considering the law and order, 52.8% of the public housing
respondents and 47.6% of private housing respondents reported
being robbed or knowing f riends and relatives be robbed.
Table 6
Tuen Mun Residents' Opinions towards Law and Order
Public Housing Private Housing Village Total
Good 10.7% 24.2% 55.0% 25.1%
Fair 30.2% 37.5% 24.4% 30.9%
Bad 59.1% 20.6% 44.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(128)(215) (107) (450)
In another study of residential satisfaction of the Tuen Mun
new town immigrants in 1979 (Han 1980). A large majority, 82.2°0,
of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction and complained about
Tuen Mun. The three main sources of complaints were
transportation, social services especially the medical services,
and the general living environment referring to dust, -smells and
noise. The following table gives a clearer picture of Tuen Mun




Opinions on Selected Aspects of Tuen Mun
Good Average Bad No Opinion Total
Intra-TM
Transportation 18.7 33.3 45.9 2.1 100%
External
Transportation 22.0 22.7 66.0 1.3 100%
General Medical
Facilities 18.1 36.8 35.7 9.5 100%
Government Medical
Facilities 11.2 20.8 59.2 8.9 100%
Schools 30.1 34.8 12.0 23.1 100%
Shopping and
Market Facilities 28.2 31.9 38.6 1.3 100%
Social Services 28.8 35.8 9.5 25.9 100%
Law and Order 53.1 29.4 16.0 1.4 100%
General Living
Environment 50.0 43.0 6.8 6 100%
By comparing the two studies, the law and order of Tuen Mur
was greatly improved, but there were still many social problems
encountered by the residents. The most frustrated problems faced
by the residents were transportation and medical facilities.
Since migration to Tuen Mun was seldom for job reasons, most of
the people worked outside there were only 37.4% of working
population worked in Tuen Mun, so it, was quite understandable
why people always complained about the poor transportation.
Concerning the governmental medical facilities, as most of the
new immigrants came from the lower class, and the governmental
medical services are cheaper than the private ones, thus the need
of low-priced medical services were expected. Moreover, there was
not. any large-scaled hospital to deal with some serious or
urgent injuries or diseases, this too dissatisfied both the
public and private housing residents. Though there were so many
problems, most of the new immigrants, 91% of them, desired to
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continue to live in Tuen Mun due to the lower rent and larger
living space, that meant they had to seek ways to change the
poor environment or pragmatically adjusted themselves to fit the
unfavorable situation. Recently Chow (1988) carried out a study
dealing with the quality of life of Tuen Mun inhabitants in 1987.
Chow found that over one third of the respondents moved into Tuen
Mun were not out of their own decisions but because of
government's arrangement. Others were mainly due to economic
consideration, the lower rents or prices. Same as the above
study, the respondents thought that the transportation and the
medical services were still inadequate, in addition, they also
expressed that there was not enough school places for their
children because most of the new immigrants' families were formed
by newly married couples with very young children. As time gone
by, there was a large sequential increase of the demands for
kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools. Yet
transportation though still a major problem felt by the
residents, medical and educational facilities had exceeded it
and became most concerned. This implied the transportation had
been improved during these ten years time. The table below
presents Chow's findings:
Table 8




9065316Transport (59.2%) (100%)310 (40.8%)
909271Markets (100%)638 (29.8%)(70.2%)
(54.4%) 831452 (100%)379Cultural and (45.6%)
recreational
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276School places (33.1%) 558 (66.9%) 834 (100%)Medical 237 (26.4%) 661 898(73.6%) (1000)Consultative 416 (63.7/) 237 (36.3%) 653 (1000)Social Welfare 236 (45.3%) 285 (54.7%) 521 (100%)
Notwithstanding, people feeling inadequate public facilities
do not imply they necessarily dissatisfied with the situation.
Therefore, Chow further studied the satisfaction of the residents
and the result is listed below:
Table 9
Satisfaction with the quality of public facilities in Tuen Mun
Facilities Satisfied Dissatisfied Total
Employment 262 435(37.6% 697(62.4%) (100%)
opportunities
Transport 389 503(43.6%) 892(56.4%) (100%)
Markets 550 344(61.5%) 894(38.5%) (100%)
Cultural and 404 398(50.4%) (49 .60//D) 802 (100%)
recreational
323 490School places (39.7%) (60. 30//G) 813 (100%)
Medical 259 612(29.7%) 871(70.3%) (100%)
Consultative 392 230(63.0%) 622(37.0%) (100%)
Social welfare 241 273 (53.1)(46.9%) 514 (1009)
Most people found discontented with the employment
opportunities, transportation, school places and medical
services. Whenever there are dissatisfactions, people can release
them either by self-adjustment or identifying an agency to
resolve the problems. Since most of the residents did not
consider moving out, in no other outlets for grievance, then
government was seemed to be the corollary for the people to
blame. The following table verifies the above anticipation:
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Table 10




Employment 267 (41.0%) 384 (59.0%) 651 (100%)opportunities
Transport 385 (45.5%) 462 847(54.5%) (100%)Markets 567 276(67.3%) 842(32.7%) (100%)Cultural and 385 (49.3%) 369 7Q1(50.7%) ( 10 0
recreational
334School places 461(42.0%) 759(58.0%) (100%)Medical 339 518(39.6%) (60.4%) 857 (100%)Consultative 401 218(64.8%) 619(35.2%) (100%)
Social welfare 235 (46.5%) 270 505(53.5%) (100%)
The main aim of presenting these studies on the social
problems confronted by the Tuen Mun new immigrants is to
demonstrate that these pervasive frustrations bred the growth of
the local pressure groups which challenged the vested interests
of the traditional rural leaders. Since the demands of the new
immigrants were very different from those of the villagers, both
the original inhabitants and early migrated refugees, so the
traditional political practice of the rural leaders were
inapplicable to these new residents. This gave a chance for the
new political elements to intrude into the power structure
previously monopolized by the traditional forces. Moreover,
facing with so much adaptive tensions, the new residents were
more politicized than their urban counterparts. Though they would
not themselves organize any protests or demonstrations to urge
the government to provide more facilities, if some persons stood
out and fought for their interests, they would certainly support
them, especially in terms of votes. From my interviews with the
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Tuen Mun elected DB members, most of them, especially those of
the new forces, admit that the Tuen Mun residents are more
politicized than those of the rest of the HK districts though
they also confess that the residents are still politically
apathetic but quite recognized their instantaneous interests. As
one of the elected DB member remarked.
The residents have little sense of citizenship and
reluctant to join any political activities. Although
they have many dislikes with the government, just like
many other residents in other districts, they seldom
have a mind to participate in public affairs neither do
they feel the need to supervise the government's
performance. However, they are more vulnerable to be
mobilized to short-term and least-effort activities in
fighting for their immediate interests. For example, in
dealing with the problems of Vietnamese refugees' and
the Light Rail Transit,2 the residents complained a lot
and some of them even acted against these measures
through organizing a self-protective security group or
complained to the radio, but in tackling with the
long-term problems, such as the inadequacy of schools
and living environment, they rarely respond so
actively. Most of the time they rely on the DB members
to solve their daily problems without knowing that the
DB is only a consultative body.
1 In 1989, the government intended to open the previously closed
Vietnamese Refugees Camp solely in Tuen Mun, and this was
strongly rejected by the Tuen Mun residents because they thought
that this would affect their security and the living environment.
Moreover the objection was reinforced by the facts that the
problems of Vietnamese refugees had been regarded as a burden of
the HK people for a long time, and this had induced a intensive,
emotional, racial hatred among the people.
2 The Light Rail Transit was originally erected for improving
the transportation in Tuen Mun and Yuen Long, but in order to
certain the profits of the LRT, the -government inhibited the bus
company to compete with the LRT in Tuen Mun and Yuen Long, this
caused many inconvenience for the residents. Furthermore, at the
beginning of the LRT to commence its services, many accidents and
inconvenience occurred and this reinforced the aversion of the
residents.
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Although the people have little sense of political
participation, they have great anticipation on the persons who
claim to represent them and fight for their interests. They are
also willing to pay a minimum effort, like voting, in return.
This kind of mentality well fits Leung's findings in his
`Perception of Political Authority by the HK Chinese'. According
to S.W. Leung (1986) HK Chinese seldom have any principle of
public concern, ideology, or detailed consideration of the
objective environment besides self-interest in evaluating
specific government policies. The political authority is treated
as an instrument and its popularity depends mainly on how well it
performs. In other words, the political authority lacks a kind of
legitimacy in terms of normative agreement which requires people
to follow rules and laws because of thinking them as right and
worthy of respect. Rather its legitimacy is based on the people
who think that it is advantageous to go along with it in order to
secure their own ends without showing any trust or normative
agreement with it. In Held's words (1987:182), they comply with
or support the authority mainly due to their pragmatic
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acquiescence or instrumental acceptance.3 As a result, once the
new residents notice that the DB members are helpful to resolve
their daily problems, they will support them in terms of votes or
other little-effort activities no matter who they are. This kind
of instrumental mentality of treating political leaders is
crucial to analyze the rise -as well as the fall of the local
pressure groups in Tuen Mun. Nevertheless, the villagers are
quite different from the new residents. As noted by one rural
leader,
The villagers are very different from the public
housing residents: they have less demand because they
have less adaptive problems. They are used to the
3. Held distinguishes seven grounds for consenting the authority:
1. coercion 2. tradition 3. apathy, in which people cannot be
brother one way or. another 4. pragmatic acquiescence, in which
people though dislike a situation, they cannot imagine things
being really different and so they accept the present situation
5. instrumental acceptance, in which people dislike things as
they are but nevertheless go along with them in order to secure
an end because it is in the long run to their advantage 6.
normative agreement, in which with available information, people
conclude it is right, correct and proper to be a member of a
collectivity, so they should comply to the rules and laws of that
collectivity 7. ideal normative agreement, in which everyone is
free from domination and reaching a consensus of an ideal
political order that none of them will normatively reject. For
details, see David Held, 1987:182,238.
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inconvenience caused by the inadequate transportation
and other public facilities. When they have problems,
they can easily seek help with the village
representative but the public housing residents are
different, they do not have such figures like those
village representatives to help them.
The villagers are more tied to their village representative
in forms of personal relationships rather than purely
instrumental reasons. Moreover, their problems are much different
from those of the new immigrants. They more concern with the land
resumption and the agricultural problems. The new town problems
are not so vital to their living, hence, the political authority
that they respected is more definite and easier to be identified
with than those of the new immigrants. In accordance with some
rural leaders, the villagers pay more respect to the village
representatives than the DB members and they are not so
enthusiastic in DB,and RC elections when none of the candidates
come from their villages. These two different forms of attitude
towards the social problems and the local authority made the
rural leaders misunderstand their roles in dealing with the new
residents and gave an opportunity for the pressure groups to
share with their power.
2. The Establishment of the Local Pressure Groups
Although political apathy is pervasive among the HK Chinese,
this does not mean none of them will not activated politically to
urge the government to provide more public facilities nor do the
social problems cultivate a potentiality for the Tuen Mun
residents to carry out social actions. In fact, in mid 80s, there
were several local pressure groups emerged in responding to the
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inadequacy of the public facilities. These local pressure groups
were established with the encouragement by some social workers
who had the ideal of social justice and citizens participation
in public decision making. There were three such kind of
organizations formed, the Tuen Mun People's Livelihood Concern
Group, the Tuen Mun Forth Viewers and Tsuen Wai Society. All of
them .involved direct or indirect participation of the social
workers. The Tuen Mun People's Livelihood Concern Group was
formed in 1984 with the former name of Joint Committee of Tuen
Mun People's Livelihood. Its establishment was promoted by a
social worker and a local resident who had already actively
involved in some territory-wide protests and demonstrations. At
the beginning, since it was not a registered body, there was a
threat that the government might attack it by claiming it as
illegal association. Hence, through the familiarity with the HK
Christian Industrial Committee4 by the two founders, the CIC
promised to claim TM People's Livelihood Concern Group as one of
its sub-organization and granted them $500 monthly subsidy as
well as providing places for their meetings. Later, as it had
registered and there was another territory pressure group helping
its members to run the DB election, TMPLCG's tie with the CIC was
lessened. The Tuen Mun Forth Viewers was registered in 1985 with
4. HK Christian Industrial Committee is a church-sponsored
pressure croup which is famous for fighting workers' interests.
For details of CIC, see Cheung 1986.
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the assistance of a social work agency. Its aims are studying and
concerning Tuen Mun local affairs as well as increasing the
residents' public awareness and community participation. Tsuen
Wai Society was formed by a community worker with an objective of
serving the local needs of the Tuen Mun people. At first, these
groups only concerned with the local livelihood of the Tuen Mun
new immigrants, and none of them had the intention to join the
governmental administrative system. Later, since some of the
social workers who were helping them were the members of a
political group, Meeting Point,5 they strongly advised the
pressure groups' leaders to run for 85 DB election. Additionally,
they were encouraged by the government because the government did
not want all the seats being monopolized by the rural forces and
she had to ensure a high voting rate through intensify the
competition. At last they decided to run the election for four
reasons. Firstly, since they are all volunteers, many expenses
of activities come from their own donation, if being elected as
DB members, they can use the government allowance to cover the
expenditure of running the associations. Secondly, being elected
as DB members, it is more convenient for them to get touch with
the residents through acquiring a formal office. Thirdly, being
formal representative of the residents, they can legitimately
fight for people's interests and attract more mass media to
Meeting Point is a political organization established in late
1982. For details, see Cheng 1984:121-4 and Leung, H.C.
1986:78-87.
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convey their viewpoints so as to expert greater pressure to the
government. Finally, at that time, the government advocated
strongly the importance of the DB in decision making of the
district affairs. This made them believe that joining the DB
could actually do something for the residents.
3. The New and Traditional Forces Compared
The newly emerged pressure groups had differed in several
aspects from the traditional groups such that the new immigrants
could easily identified them. Ideologically, the new groups were
more democratic and ambitious in raising the political awareness
of the people. They emphasized the people participation in public
policies and the supervision of the official performance.
Ideally, the pressure groups leaders thought that they should at
least play four roles: public spokesperson, community organizer,
community educators and grievance arbitrator. Being a public
spokesperson, one has to articulate and aggregate the public
interests. There are several ways one can collect people's wills:
1. from the complaints of the residents, 2. through opinion
surveys and researches 3. through face-to-face interactions, 4.
one's own perception of the needs of the residents and what one
thinks as the basic human right and necessities. After knowing
the inclinations of the people, one should formulate them into
possible policy-alternatives, then tries one's best to actualize
them for the people. Being a community organizer, one has to
organize the atomized public into a collectivity through which
the people can make their own decisions, resolve their own
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problems and fight for their own interests. Being a community
educator, one needs to uplift the political consciousness of the
residents, to make them aware of their genuine interests and
rights. In playing this role, they emphasize the importance
and the need of democracy and public participation. Finally,
being a grievance arbitrator, one has to help the people in
dealing with the mis-behaviors of the government officials that
causing residents' inconvenience or sufferings. Furthermore, one
has to superintend the official performance in commencing public
policies from time to time, see whether these measures are
operating effectively and efficiently. On the contrary, the rural
leaders could be treated as more conservative in all the four
roles mentioned above. They also regarded themselves as the
public spokespersons, community organizer, community educator and
grievance arbiter, but their natures were very different. Since
the rural leaders had been recognized as the representatives of
the villagers for a long time, when they became the DB members,
they did not change their previous of perception of
representativeness. Being a village representative, the needs of
the villages could easily be grasped by them because they were
living together and with frequent direct interactions. Further,
the villagers would take initiatives to contact them when finding
troubles, so the rural leaders were not necessary to carry out
any kinds of opinion collection because they thought that they
had already known the demands of the people. Consequently, they
acted as public spokespersons without consulting the represented
beforehand, they trusted that their own perception and judgement
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could actually reflect the needs of the residents. Unlike the
new pressure groups, which would actively find the needs of the
electorate even they received no complaints, they only passively
helped those sought assistance from them. Being a community
organizer, they seldom establish neighborhood associations like
those formed by the new groups leaders, they only gave some
financial aids to some traditional local agencies such as MACs
and local recreational clubs. Being a community educator, they
did not promote any ideal of democracy or direct political
participation, instead, they stressed the harmony of the
community. Finally, being a grievance arbiter, though they
seldom took initiatives to mediate the disputes between the
residents and officials, they did help those complained to them
negotiate with the officials. Overall, the traditional groups
were more paternalistic and elitist, they were reluctant to
accept the public participation while the new groups were more
liberal and democratic and they really wanted to increase the
public involvement in community affairs. These kinds of
dissimilarity are well illustrated by three controversies in DB
meetings: against coopted DB member writing to the press about
local issues instead of raising such matters in a meeting,
whether to hold the DB sub-committee meetings in public, and
about the speed of introducing direct LegCo election. In 1984,
the DB unofficial offices were monopolized by the rural groups,
but there were some pressure groups leaders coopted into the
sub-committees. In one occasion, the rural groups found that one
of the new groups member wrote to press to complain about one of
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the social problem discussed in the committee, so they proposed
to discuss this issue in the Board and suggested setting some
disciplinary guidelines to inhibit same things to happen.6 The
response of the rural groups might reflect their conservative
mentality that every local issues raised in DB should be handled
in the DB only, any actions of arousing the public were regarded
as inappropriate and disturbing the harmony of the community. In
1985, after some of the pressure groups leaders had joined the
DB, they immediately proposed to hold sub-committee meetings in
public, however, the rural leaders showed reservations about this
ideas.? In considering the further development of the
representative government, all the new groups members suggested
holding direct election of the Legislative Council in 1988, but
all except one rural groups members rejected 88 election.8
Apart from the divergence in the democratic values, the two
forces had discrepancy in the ways -of handling interpersonal
relationship, especially with the government officials. The
traditional groups had great accentuation on harmonious
interpersonal relationships and face-saving. Although conflicts
6. See DB third meeting minutes on August 10, 1984.
7. See DB first and second meeting minutes on April 19, 1985 and
June 20, 1985. The same issue occurred in 1988, ten rural leaders
still cast no to the proposal of the admission of the public to
the committee meetings, see first DB meeting minutes on April 18,
1988.
8• See DD third meeting memorandum on August 18,1987.
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truly existed between the rural leaders and the government
officials, the rural leaders seldom attacked the officials
openly, rather they would use tactics of persuasion and
concession to achieve compromising solutions. Being maintaining
a good relation with the official for a long time and
treating the government as their ultimate power
distributor, the rural leaders were quite respectful to the
officials and tried their best not to make the underlying
conflicts manifest. The most common way to persuade the
officials to accept their demands was to invite them to have
dinners, in which expressing their opinions. Even when there
existed no conflicts, the rural leaders would still utilize any
non-illegal means to cultivate a good personal ties with the
officials. By contrast, the new groups had more manifest
conflicts with the officials because of their goals of monitoring
the officials performance and fighting for betterment of the
general livelihood of the people. Confrontation always arose from
the disagreement of the allocation of resources or some
officials' mis-behaviors. Additionally, since they did not
avid to please the officials and their objective of
awakening public consciousness, they would like to employ more
radical strategies to realize their demands, such as protests,
signature campaigns, attacking the officials openly in the
Board meetings, raising to the press and petitions to the
-Legislative councillors or Governor etc.. This kind of
difference between the traditional and the new groups were
reinforced by their diverse apprehension of the government. The
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rural leaders considered the government as a patron, a power and
resources dispenser whereas the democratic groups regarded the
government as an authoritarian entity which discouraged citizen
participation and reluctant to improve people's living. As one
pressure group elected DB noted,
"The rural camp has more friendly relation with the
officials than us. When we find some of the policies
unacceptable, we will use any means, including some
radical strategies to give pressure to the government,
but the rural groups seldom do this. For example, in
the issue of Vietnamese refugees, after they got some
prior information from the officials that a refugee
camp will be erected near one of its member's
representing village, the affected rural leader
persuade me to fight against the government instead of
expressing objection by himself. This case beautifully
reflects their obedient mentality toward the
government."
In respect of their relationship with the residents, that of
the democratic camp was much closer than that of the rural camp.
The pressure groups employed many to means to communicate with
the mass: 1. distributing newsletters monthly or seasonally in
order to report their performance, 2. posting bills and notices
on the wall of the ground floors of each blocks in the housing
estates to recount the ongoing process in dealing with the social
problems or remind the citizens to be careful about some local
issues, 3. carrying out door-to-door canvassing to gather
residents needs or gain their support in fighting against the
unacceptable policies, 4. holding residents meetings or
signature campaigns in order to attract their attention in some
local or territory-wide issues, 5. organizing protests or
campaigns to express residents' grievance, 6. forming district
residents associations to establish formal channels to contact
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the people. The pressure leaders always intended to establish a
two-way relationship with the people while the rural camp seldom
did the same actions. The relationship between the people and the
traditional groups was one-way only, they had never reported the
ongoing process of the issues being tackled directly to the
people, nor did they purposively congregate people's needs. The
most common ways of reporting their performance were constantly
exchanging ideas and opinions with MAC chairmen and members of
the traditional associations like chambers of commerce and local
voluntary welfare agencies.9 This made the Tuen Mun new residents
feel that the traditional leaders were incapable and selfish,
only taking the interests of the original inhabitants into
consideration.
Besides, there were distances between these two camps in
their evaluation of the social problems due to their dissimilar
socio-economic background and past experiences. Among the
traditional leaders, especially the appointed DB members, they
had a higher socio-economic status than the pressure groups
leaders which were mostly the public housing estate residents.
From the tables below, it can easily noticed that most of the
rural leaders were quite wealthy:
9. For detailed comparison of the new and traditional groups in
ways of reporting their performance, see the survey conducted by
the Tuen Mun Star on June 18, 1986.
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Table 11a
S.E.S. of the Candidates in 85 DB Election
Pressure Group
Rural Background Background Unidentified 10
Businessman 16 0 5
Teacher 1 2 0
Housewife 0 1 0
Worker 0 1 2
Social Worker 0 1 0
Executive n 1 0
Sales
Representative 2 0 0
Others 0 2 1
Table 1 lb
S.E.S. of the unofficial DB Members in 1985
Pressure Group
Rural Background Background Neutral
Businessman 13 0 0
Teacher 1 2 0
Housewife 0 1 0
Worker 0 1 0
Social Worker 0 1 0
Executive 0 1 0
Surveyor 1 0 0
Others 1 2 1
The higher socio-economic background and the passive contact
with the residents made the rural leaders hard to comprehend the
real living environment and demands of the people. Moreover,
10. Most of the unidentified persons were the chairmen of the
MACs and local Kaifong-liked associations. None of them were
members of the pressure groups,-and they might even classified as
the traditional groups b.ecause they had close relations with the
rural 1-eaders. But since they competed with some of the core
members of the traditional groups, so they were not supported in
this elections.
11 There was only one neutral -member who did not belong to any
groups, however, since he had frequently agreed with the opinions
of the pressure groups members, so he was not appointed in 1988.
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their past village living experiences and over-interactions with
the villagers relative to the new immigrants posed additional
difficulties in recognizing the needs of the housing estates
dwellers because they still applied the rural standards to
evaluate the seriousness of some new town problems. As an elected
pressure group DB member observed,
In an open forum of discussing the adequacy of the
medical services, I compared the medical facilities
according to the international standard and my previous
living place, Tsuen Wan, with the present situation of
Tuen Mun, and I concluded that medical services were
not enough to meet the vast demand. However, one of the
rural leader said that the present medical facilities
had greatly improved, as formerly, he had to travel a
long distance to a clinic for treatment, but now there
are so many clinics for him to cure his illness. Thus
he concluded that the present facilities are enough.
The weakness of the traditional leaders to reflect the
genuine needs of the residents is further confirmed by a study of
the leaders, officials and citizens in urban service delivery in
1983, the researchers found that there existed a discrepancy in
the perception of most urgent community problems between
residents and traditional leaders.12 The researchers found that
the leaders were more authoritarian, more elitist and less daring
in policy innovations than the officials. Many of them are
inactive and dependent on the government. Moreover, though there
12, The 'local leaders surveyed by the researchers can be treated
as= traditional groups leaders only without those of the pressure
groups members because, in 1983, the pressure groups had not been
formed yet.
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were 45% of resident respondents claimed to have great interests
in local affairs and 46% discussed local affairs with other, 46%
of the leaders had no contact with residents and only 29% took
the initiative to contact citizens once a week or more. (Lau et
al 1986) This showed that the communicative gap between the rural
leaders and the residents was quite large. The gap between the
perception of the adequacy and the seriousness of the social
problems paved the way of success for the pressure groups in
85 and 86 elections. According to Susskind and Elliott
(1983:5-15), three patterns of public participations can be
classified: paternalism, conflict and coproduction. Paternalistic
participation is characterized that the municipal decision making
is highly centralized and advice giving by citizens is either
discouraged or closely managed by local government officials.
Though some direct' involvement of residents is allowed to
legitimize decisions, it can only be approved on the basis of
their election or appointment. Other forms of involvement is
viewed as costly and possibly counterproductive, since the
participation of self-interested and often uninformed individuals
may sidetrack elected and appointed officials responsible for
balancing the concerns of all interest groups. Citizen advice is
considered as a supplement rather than a constituent part of
policy decision making. However, conflict is the pattern of
participation in which centralized decision -making is dominant
but resident groups s-truggle openly to-wrest control over certain
resource-allocation or policy decisions from elected or appointed
officials. The forms of citizen actions including petitions or
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political organization aimed at influencing the outcome of
elections, demonstrations, protests, and, on occasion, violence.
Since a willingness to compromise and accept government's
invitation to participate in a government-sponsored participatory
process may help to legitimize that process without ensuring the
outcome, citizen groups may adopt a long-range strategy of
opposition if they feel they have more to gain from conflict than
from short-term victories. The coproduction is a pattern of
participation in which decisions are made through face-to-face
negotiation between decision makers and residents claiming a
major stake in particular decisions. The government officials not
only accept the legitimacy of citizen groups' involvement in the
process of deciding but also the residents might share
responsibility for the production of services or the management
of the development process. Further, these three patterns of
participation can be defined by the relationship between elected
officials and citizens:
A paternalistic pattern of participation suggests that
elected officials are unwilling to endorse direct
citizen involvement in the design or management of
services and development... Participation characterized
by conflict suggests that elected officials are
unwilling to permit the level of direct involvement
that citizen are seeking... Coproduction suggests that
officials and citizens have reached accord on the
appropriate role of residents and consumers in the
design and management of service delivery systems and
development. (Susskind and Elliott 1983:14-5)
It could seen that paternalism was prevailing in the
non-urbanized rural areas of Tuen Mun, in which the rural leaders
monopolized the control over negotiation with the government on
the design of services delivery and development. But in the
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urbanized areas conflict was dominant. Since the rural leaders
could not articulate the interests of the new habitants, hence,
many pressure groups openly attacked the district policies and
expressed dissatisfaction with the rural leaders. The
irresponsiveness of the rural leaders urged the pressure groups
to run for the elections in order to realize a coproduction
pattern of participation. The different orientation toward the
patterns of participation between the traditional and new groups
explained their divergence in the relationship with the residents
and government officials and the strategies used in meeting the
demands of the residents. As the rural leaders inclined to
paternalism, they were more reluctant to admit public
participation. Therefore, they maintained a distance from the
residents. Nevertheless, since the pressure groupswant to achieve
coproduction ultimately, so they were aware of organizing the
residents and kept close connection with them.
4. The Success of the New Force in 85 and 86 Elections
In 85 DB and 86 RC elections, the pressure groups gained a
very success. All the 8 candidates of the pressure groups in DB
and 2 in RC election were elected with vote highly exceeding
their rural counterparts.
Table 12a
85 DB Electoral Results in Districts with
Pressure Group Candidates
MarginalBackground of
.No. of Votes Result DifferenceConstituency Candidates
4740 ElectedPressure GroupTai Hing
6434097 ElectedPressure Group
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Rural 2720 Failed 1377
MAC 806 Failed 1914
Unidentified 153 Failed 653
TM South East Pressure Group 3522 Elected
Rural 2891 Elected 631
.Unidentified 2182 Failed 709
Rural 1395 Failed 787
Yau Oi Pressure Group 3253 Elected
Pressure Group 3218 Elected 45
MAC 1502 Failed 1716
MAC 1311 Failed 191
MAC 878 Failed 433
TM South West Pressure Group 4167 Elected
Pressure Group 3684 Elected 483
Rural 1309 Failed 2375
Rural 1194 Failed 105
MAC 333 Failed 861
MAC 294 Failed 39
Castle Peak Pressure Group 2941 Elected
Rural 918 Elected 023
Rural 564 Failed 354
Unidentified 166 Failed 398
Table 12b
86 RC Electoral Result
Background of Marginal
No. of VotesConstituency Candidates Result Difference
T n Mun F.a_st_ 14795Pressure Group Elected 10030
4765Rural Failed
6939Tuen Mun West ElectedPressure Group 1981
4950 FailedRural
When asking the pressure groups leaders what made the people
'51: for them, all of them said that it was because they sharedvote
the same attitudes with the residents and the people also felt
the traditional leaders were incapable to reflect their needs
exactly. One of them remarked,
The residents regarded us as the messiah and hated the
rural leaders. They thought that we can realize their
demands and helped them to improve their livelihood.
Accordingly, they voted for us in both DB and RC
-elections.
The reasons for their success were numerous, apart trom the
bad images of the traditional leaders in the minds of the
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residents, the electoral strategies of the pressure groups should
also be taken into account. With the experience of 82 election,
the traditional leaders still employed their outdated electoral
practice through personal relationship to gain votes.
Nevertheless, the pressure groups adopted a new strategy. First,
once the pressure group members decided to run the offices, they
began to carry out the electoral campaign before applying to be
the candidates. Thus they got ahead of their counterparts in
propaganda. Secondly, they carefully designed a good image for
the candidates, for instance, the female one was packaged into a
gentle and well-educated lady with a soft voice in order to
avoid being perceived as a common housewife while the worker
candidate was packaged as a good-tempered gentleman without any
rough manners. Thirdly, they used many attractive posters and
electronic media to propagate their images. Fourthly, the
pressure group candidates were more well-prepared in answering
the questions raised in the electoral forums. Fifthly, their
platforms and propagating slogans were well written and exactly
highlighted the needs of the residents. On the contrary, the
platform and slogans of the traditional leaders were much more
ambiguous and vague in comparing with those of the new groups.
Sixthly, the pressure group candidates not only showed their
past records of fighting for the interests of the residents but
also actively raised new issues in order to make the voter
feeling that they would really represent their' interests and-
would actualize their promises after being elected. This gave a
great preference to them because the traditional leaders had
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given a bad impression to the voters. Seventhly, the pressure
group candidates also helped the government to do voter
registration for this would offer a chance for them to contact
personally and impressed the potential voters. Additionally, they
did more door-to-door canvassing and self-held resident
consulting meeting than the traditional leaders. For example,
the two pressure group candidates in Tai Hing had published three
different style posters and one election newsletter, prepared two
exhibitions and one propagating video, and held two resident
consulting forums. As well, the campaign volunteers of them has
standard symbols, slogans, songs, styles of dress, and other
identifying marks which attract much attention of the voters and
gave a pleasant impression to the.residents. In sum, the pressure
group candidates did better than the traditional groups
candidates in mobilizing the voters. This was well illustrated by
the enthusiasm of their campaign volunteers to mobilize the
electors to cast vote to the pressure group candidates. The most
striking phenomena happened in Tai Hing, even after the closing
time of the election station, many voters still insisted to vote
for the pressure group candidates.
Apart from the electoral strategies, the traditional leaders
looked down on the pressure group also explained their failure.
As noted by one pressure group leader,
The traditional force regarded us as young tucks who
were incapable to challenge their seats- in DB. Hence,
before the election they did not compromise who would
run for the office. Consequently, many -MAC chairmen
applied to be the candidates, this not only shattered
their material as well as human resources, but also
smashed their votes from their loyal supporters.
Moreover, they neglected that the government helped us
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substantially in lending us some electoral material in
order to balance the power between the traditional and
new forces."
The encouragement and the convenience given to the pressure
groups by the government was confirmed by one of the rural
background informants, he seriously condemned the District
Office of causing the rise of the new groups and hampering the
harmony of the community. Having so many unfavorable factors, it
is not a surprise that the traditional force lost eight seats in
DB and two seats in RC to the pressure groups.
B. The Nature of the New Force
1. Aggregate of Several Social Movement Organizations
Although the establishment of the pressure groups in Tuen
Mun was mainly a response to the inadequacy of public facilities,
it also crucial to note that their ideal of democratizing the
local as well as HK political systems in order to bring along
with a coproduction pattern of participation. Their democratic
orientation made their action inseparable from the democratic
movement ongoing in wider HK. Hence, in order to understand the
nature of the new force in Tuen Mun, one cannot neglect the
nature of the HK democratic movement. The tradition of HK social
movement can be traced back to the late 60s, which was carried
out by the students' enthusiasm in reforming the colonial
society. Later in the mid 70s, accompanied with the students,
many pressure groups boomed in advocating social actions and
direct protests against social injustices, especially those
imposed by the colonial government. A milestone of the
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development of the pressure groups was the Campaign Against
Increase in Bus-Fare in 1981. Afterward,13 the pressure groups
jointed together and formed a Joint Committee for the Supervision
of the Public Utilities (some of the founders of the Tuen Mun
pressure groups also affiliated to this Committee). When the
issue of 1997 appeared, the colonial government embarked a
political reform. In the beginning, the pressure groups did not
recognized the chance of changing the status quo, but later when
the decolonization took place, there was a race for filling the
political vacuum among the HK elites. For fearing that the richer
and the conservative groups would monopolize the future political
system, the pressure groups leaders decided to join into this
race of inheriting the power left by the colonial government. In
1985 under the propaganda of the representative government,
especially the importance of the DB, they recognized that the
running DB election would be a possible way to intrude into the
HK political power center, the Legislative Council. An historical
opportunity, which was facilitated by the British government in
her course of negotiating with the Chinese government, seemed to
be existed for them to reform the whole society. Moreover, the
13. After the bus-fare incident, the leaders of these grassroot
pressure groups were still searching issues to foster
cooperation, for instance, the campaign to protest against the
revision of history textbooks by the Japanese Ministry of
Education in 1982, the campaign against inflation in 1983. (Cheng
1984:113)
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weakness of the local traditional forces promised their success
in the local political arena, therefore they did actively
participate in 85 DB and 86 UC as well as RC elections. On one
hand, they feared that their inaction might result further
consolidation of the local traditional forces which would
restrain their penetration into the local communities in
preparing future LegCo election based on universal suffrage. On
the other hand, this was a chance for them to establish a
basement to seize power through mobilizing the residents as
supporters. (Leung, H.C. 1986: 25-53) In the past the collective
actions of the pressure groups were ad hoc and issue-oriented in
directing at betterment of the general livelihood of the lower
class, but now democracy becomes their prime movement's goal.
Yet the pressure groups were difficult to form a united front due
to their internal competition and strategic divergence. This not
only occurred in the territory level, but also reflected in the
district level like Tuen Mun.
To understand the dynamic of the interactions of these
pressure groups, the resource mobilization approach can be
employed. A social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a
population which represents preferences for changing some
elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a
society whereas a countermovement is a set of opinions and
beliefs-in a population= opposed to a social movement. For- the
success, a social movement must evince a minimal degree of
organization. These organizations are known as social movement
organizations (SMOs) which identify with the preferences of a
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social movement and attempt to implement those goals. All SMOs
constitute a social movement industry (SMI)---- an
organizational analogue of a social movement.14 The social
movement sector (SMS) consists of all SMIs in a society no
matter to which SM they are attached. For the appropriate SM
there are adherents and constituents. Adherents are those
individuals and organizations that believe in the goals of the
movement and the constituents of a SMO are those providing
resources.15 McCarthy and Zald also suggest to distinguish
between conscious adherents/constituents and beneficiary
adherents/constituents. The former support the social movement
but not stand to benefit directly from the success in goal
accomplishment of the SMO while the latter directly gain from
14, The distinction of an SM and an SMI has several advantages:
1. it emphasizes that SMs are never fully mobilized. 2. it
focuses explicitly upon the organizational component of activity.
3. it recognizes explicitly that SMs are typically represented by
more than one SMO. 4. it allows the possibility of accounting the
rise and fall of SMIs which is not totally dependent on the size
of an SM or the intensity of the preferences within it. (McCarthy
and Zald 1982:1219)
15, The primary task of mobilization is to convert by-standers
into adherents or constituents, then converting adherents into
constituents and maintaining constituent involvement. Therefore,
their appeals to mass media is one of the most strategy to catch
public attention in order to recruit them into the movement.
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it. (McCarthy and Zald 1982:1217-22) According to Tilly, two
distinguished models are used to analyze the phenomenon of
social movement: polity and mobilization models. The polity model
provides an general analysis of the structures and the dynamics
within an SMS or an SMI, while the mobilization model deals with
the behavior of individual SMOs. In the polity model, there are
four components: government, contenders, polity and coalitions.
The contenders include both challengers and members of the
polity. A member is any contender which has routine, low-cost
access to resources controlled by the government a challenger is
any other contender who seeks ways to become a member. The polity
consists of the collective action of the members and the
government. Coalition is a tendency of a set of contenders and/or
governments to coordinate their collective action. Thus social
movement seen in this light is the normal process of all
contenders struggling for power in order to realize their
interests. All challengers seek to enter the polity while the
members seek to remain in the polity and attempt to block the
entrance of the challengers who wish to share power. In the
process of struggling power, some of the contenders will form
coalition with the government. (Tilly 1978:52-4) In the
mobilization model, there are five components: interest,
organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action
itself. Interests are the shared advantages or disadvantages
likely to accrue to the population in question as a consequence
of various possible interactions with other populations.
Organization is the structure of a group which most directly
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affects its capacity to act on its interests. Mobilization is
the process by which a group acquires collective control over
the resources needed for action. Opportunity concerns the
relationship between a group and the world around it.
Opportunity has three elements: power, repression and
opportunity/threat. Power is the extent to which the outcomes of
the population's interactions with other populations favor its
interests over those of the others. Repression is the cost of
collective action to the contender resulting from interaction
with other groups. Opportunity/threat is the extent to which
other groups are either vulnerable to new claims which would
enhance the contender's realization of its interests or
threatening to make claims which would subjugate the contender's
realization. Collective action is the extent of a contender's
joint action in pursuit of common ends. (Tilly 1978:54-5)
In the HK political context, the pressure groups are the
challengers who see an opportunity opened by the colonial
government's introduction of the representative government, so
they seek to enter the polity. They actively foster the
democratization of the political system as both strategy and
target. Nevertheless, they are impeded by the conservative bloc
including the capitalists, the present polity incumbents and the
pro-government groups. The democratic movement as a SMI is not
only fragmented horizontally,- with many SMOs with different
scopes and specialization of goals, but also further atomized
vertically, with the political groups at the territory levels and
the residents' organizations at the local level. Though some
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collective actions can be launched out jointly on some rather
straightforward and vague common interests such as the advocacy
of 88 LegGo direct election and the campaign against the
establishment of the Daya Bay nuclear plant, in the less
ambiguous and more concrete issues, especially concerning the
power distribution, they hardly compromise a consensus.
Furthermore there are intense competitions in elections among
these territory SMOs since most of them have the ambition to
seize the political power and all of them have the same starting
point in this race of inheriting power. None of them have the
party-like organizational support or plentiful resources which
give them advantages over the other SMOs. The mobilization
resources can be divided into tangible and intangible ones. The
tangible resources include money, space, means of publication
while intangible resources can be further differentiated into
specialized human resources like expertise, access to networks
and decision makers, and status etc. and unspecialized ones
such as time and commitment. (Freeman 1979:170-6) Since most of
the SMOs in HK are formed by the lower-middle class and the lower
class, they are low in tangible but relatively high in people
resources. However, the supply of the human resources is not
adequate and permanent, most of the volunteers work temporarily
without serious commitment. Thus, indeed, none of the SMOs have
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been well developed.16 This fact is well recognized by the y e SMOs'
leaders. Consequently, none of them is willing to be subordinate
to other SMOs, they all attempt to mobilize as much resources as
possible to be the forerunner. Considering HK's small political
stratum, the availability of political volunteer is very
restricted, as proposed by Zald and McCarthy (1980:5): Under
conditions of the declining availability of marginal resources,
direct competition and conflict between SMOs with similar goals
can be expected to increase. Recently, a hot issue is often
discussed in the democratic SMI: how the democratic `triad', HK
Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, Meeting Point
and HK Affairs Society17 can form at least an electoral
coalition, if not possible to merge into an united organization
to avoid direct confrontation in 1991 LegCo direct election.
Nevertheless, up to now, there still seems no solution
acceptable to all the three SMOs. As Zald and Ash (1966:245)
predicted coalition-mergers are most likely to take place when
there is one indivisible position or reward at stake, but the
16, There are many difficulties in raising political funds or
financial supports from the general public, the most effective
and efficient ways to grow is to recruit constituents and
adherents who may support the development of the SMO because
sometimes the human resources can be converted into tangible
resources and the people resources are more accessible.
17. For the details of these organization, see Leung, H.C.
1986:78-92, 99-101.
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elections provide not only one indivisible seats, but many 3
offices. This implies their competition will continue. As
election becomes the major way to enter the polity, the SMOs will
face an dilemma in recruiting members: whether demand relatively
little from the members in order to attract more potential
adherents to join or demand heavy commitments from the
constituents in order to assure the organizational discipline.
The former is adopted by the inclusive SMOs and the latter is
used by the exclusive SMOs. Although the inclusive SMO's
membership rises much faster than that of the exclusive one, it
also declines much quicker because competing values and attitudes
are more readily mobilized in the inclusive organization. (Zald
and Ash 1966:240) Since every SMO favors a long-term
organizational development of being a quasi-political party,
though multiple membership is still endured, the SMOs will favor
more strict member discipline. Accordingly, the competition for
resources for the SMOs will increase because the more exclusive
the SMO is, the more they treat membership as a zero-sum
resource. As more SMOs with exclusive membership requirements
compete for a limited pool of potential members, the greater
possibility of potential conflict resulted. (Zald and McCarthy
1980:5-6,9) The reasons for the increase of the conflict due to
competition are: 1. The scarcity of the mobilizable resources
make the SMO-s feeling that the competition is an zero-sum one,
the gain of one SMO means the loss of the others. 2. Since the
SMO's survival depends on the membership which is the only
resource that the SMO can utilize, the flow of membership to
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other SMOs not only hampers its development even threaten its
existence. 3. For their similarity in both ideology and stage of
organizational development, the SMOs often exaggerate their minor
differences or the faults and weaknesses of the other SMOs in
order'to convince people to join. As a result, these over-stated
differences and gossips of other SMOs may become the ground of
their cleavages and obstruct further cooperation. 4. In running
for the elections, SMOs may use some strategies which are seen as
appropriate or immoral by other SMOs and this deepens the
conflicts.
The linkage between the territory and local SM.Os are
complicated too. Most of the local SMOs are mainly the residents
groups which are built directly or indirectly by the community
workers of a few voluntary agencies to counteract the alienated
relationship of people living in urban neighborhood. These SMOs
have several limitations: 1. Since these SMOs are organized
around a specific issue or complaint, thus they are normally
short-lived and dissipate once the issue is over. 2. Since people
often perceive a high participatory cost (both time and effort)
in these SMOs, thus the sponsoring community workers have to
put more resources to attract the residents. As a result, they
become more and more reluctant to invest on these SMOs. Moreover,
under the pressure from above, the community workers can only
hold a loose relationship with these SMOs, this make SNOs have to
seek their own ways to collect necessary resources to maintain
their survival. 3. These SMOs may be strong in mobilizing people
for activities, but not also can they recruit them as members. To
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recruit members, they often move into the role of service
provision based on individual incentives. (Leung, C.B.
1986:361-5) These limitations impose a dilemma to these SMOs:
within a material constraint they cannot actively involve in,
both participating in the race of inheriting power and improving
residents livelihood, through constantly mobilizing the people.
They have to choose only one of them as their major objective.
Moreover, though most of the local SMOs have some ties with the
territory SMOs, their linkages are far from an institutional one.
Even the local SMO is one of the members of the territory SMO, it
may not receive any resources or be effectively disciplined form
above. The membership denotes as a symbol rather than a actual
relationship. Their cooperations are ad hoc and issue-oriented
rather than constant and all-the-time ones. However, this does
not mean that the territory SMOs do not demand obligations from
their local followers because the success in elections require
close coordination and cooperation. In addition, though the prime
aim of the local SMOs is to improve the residents' livelihood,
this does not mean they do not have any political ambitions in
public offices. Under this only obligation without necessary
resource-support' situation, the local SMOs find hard to fulfill
all the requests raised by the territory SMOs. Even more, as most
of these local SMOs are self-created, they all want to maintain
their own autonomy and unwilling to be subordinate to the
territory SMOs. This further blocks the establishment of a closer
tie between the territory and the local SMOs. Moreover, the
leader of the local SMOs are mostly the beneficiary constituents
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but the leaders of the territory SNOs are the conscience
constituents in fighting for the improvement of the local public
livelihood; however, the vice versa appears in seizing the
central political power, the seats in LegCo. Thus a diverse in
emphasizing the priority of improving citizen livelihood or
entering the political center inevitably becomes an additional
obstacle for them coming together closely. The relationship
between the local and territory SMOs will be explored in the
concrete context of Tuen Mun.
2. Local SMO versus Territory SMO
As mentioned before, there were three dominant local SMOs in
Tuen Mun in 1985. Previously, these SMOs's leaders had no
intention to run for the DB election, but later under the
persuasion of the Meeting Point, a territory SMO, and the
encouragement of the District Office, they decided to compete
with the traditional groups. At that time, the whole political
atmosphere in HK was quite encouraging, there sounded a great
prospect in climbing up the political ladder through becoming a
DB member. This was not only attractive to the territory SMOs
but also charming to the local SMOs. As a result, a dual process
occurred: the politicization of the local SMOs in terms of going
into the institution to voice out their demands and the
localization of the territory SMOs to consolidate their local
power bases. In Tuen Mun the MP began its regionalization
strategy through intruding one of the local SMO, Tuen Mun
People's Livelihood Concern Group, because some of the leaders of
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TMPLCG had close connection with the social worker members of MP.
These MP members first helped them to organize activities, later
one of its-member joined TMPLCG and convinced them to run
election. At first, some of the TMPLCG leaders were quite
hesitant to accept this MP member, but later they were persuaded.
There were several reasons: first, they could rely on the
resources provided by MP. Second, some of them had the ambition
to become the DB members. Third, they found common interests and
attitudes toward the Tuen Mun social problems and the
democratizing HK political system. Finally, MP was composed of
educated people who could compensate TMPLCG's lack of
intellectual members. Consequently, Tuen Mun became the main
target of MP to start its regionalizd program and it
enthusiastically helped TMPLCG's leaders to design the election
campaign and formed an election alliance with other local SMOs.
Since other local SMOs had not yet found any power distributive
conflicts, so they were willing to come together and form an
election alliance. After the election, all the eight SMOs'
members were elected. MP tried to incorporate members from other
local SMOs. Now the other local SMOs faced a dilemma of being an
autonomous entity of fighting only the local residents' interests
or being subordinate to a territory political group aiming
seizing central political power. They saw TMPLCG once
incorporated by MP, their leaders lost their autonomy in decision
making and voicing their own opinions because MP had a quite
bureaucratic structure and heavily demanded members' compliance.
Moreover, being an political group, MP tried to exclude all
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possible competitors including the local SIOs. although this was
a normal phenomena in the process of seizing power, the local
SMOs saw it as immoral and threatening to their survival. They
not only condemned MP aiming to split the democratic camp in
order to advance its own development but also blamed MP's
strategy providing a chance for the traditional groups to strike
back. Even worse, this view was also shared by some members of
TMPLCG who had become MP's members. One of them, who was a former
MP's member but had left MP, complained,
Though I think the cut-throat competition between MP
and other small groups is inevitable, MP's strategy of
exclusion was carried out too early. In this political
situation, it should first extinguish the traditional
groups, then competes with the other democratic groups.
Moreover, MP suppressed the small groups too much.
When I decided to form an election coalition with my
colleague in the constituency, MP refused to give her
supports and even nominated another person with no hope
of winning to compete with her only because she is not
its member. Therefore, I decided to leave.
One of the former member of MP explained why he left MP
because he was also a member of one of the local SMOs. He faced a
loyalty problem in 88 DB election. His local SMO and MP
separately nominated different persons to run the election in his
constituency, but he could only have one election partner. If he
allied with the MP member, he would be treated as a renegade of
his local SMO, but if he chose another, he would receive huge
pressure from MP. Since there were only two seats in his
constituency, no compromise could be made. Since he began his
political life in that local SMO, so his power base was still
there. At last he coalesced with the local SMO's member and left
MP. Likewise, between the local and the territory SMOs there are
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obvious contradicting orientations toward government policies.
The local SMOs are more localistic, they give priority in
promoting local affairs and seldom put them in territory-wide
consideration, but the territory SMO is just the vice versa. For
instance, in the problem of Vietnamese refugees, one of the MP
members commented,
We see Vietnamese refugees problem as a whole HK
problem and it should resolved territorially. Since
it is impossible for us to close them in the camps all
their lives, so we agree with the open camp policy. But
we just reject establishing only one open camp in Tuen
Mun but not the whole policy, therefore we suggest to
delay the open camp policy and urge government to
settle them evenly in all parts of HK. However, our
counterparts just oppose opening the refugee camp in
Tuen Mun and suggest to re-settle them in an isolated
island without giving any territory-wide solution.
As MP is a territory political group aiming of taking
central political power, so its primary focus is put on the
allocation of resources based on territory consideration. It
cannot be so localistic, otherwise the general public will not
recognize it as representing the whole HK people interests. Thus,
MP's members always remind themselves to concern all the issues
in a wider HK context rather than only delimiting to Tuen Mun.
Nevertheless, as the original intention for the establishment of
the local SMOs is to improve Tuen Mun residents' livelihood
rather than aiming at the LegCo power, accordingly they put more
emphasis on the local interests. Politically speaking, unlike MP,
Tuen Mun is the only power base of the local SMOs, thus they- have
to be more localistic in order to ensure sufficient supports for
survival as well as development.
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-5iue from their dissimilarity in localistic mentality, the
political objectives weigh a difference too. For MP is a
political entity, it primary target is to gain political capital.
But this does not mean that MP does not fight for the residents
interests. Being a territory political group, Tuen Mun is not
their sole power base, it has to expand to other districts as
well. Yet under the constraint of resources, it has to use the
least efforts to earn the greatest returns. On the one hand, MP
need consolidate its Tuen Mun power base, on the other hand, it
has to reserve a sizable resources to expand itself. In order to
accumulate political capital efficiently, thus its involvement in
local affairs is much selective, based on careful calculation of
cost and benefits. Correspondingly, its degree of interference in
local affairs is not equal. MP will put more energy on those
issues which will attract more media exposure and residents'
credits. Moreover, it will also employ more emotional and
appealing strategies in their course of actions. One of the rural
background informant observed that,
"They often actively voice out their opinions, no
matter these opinions have been repeated by other DB
members, when the media reporters are present in the
DB meetings. Moreover, they seldom put efforts on
minor issues or involve in any local recreational
activities even they are the members of the committees
which are responsible for organizing these activities.
After all, they only want to build up their own images
and claim all the credits from the residents."
Catching public attention is not only done by MP, other
groups, including the traditional groups often undertake too, but
this is more skillfully handled by 'MP. Considering the local
S`'IOs, their power bases and original aims of formation are
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totally bounded in Tuen Mun, it is hard to imagine they do not
engage in every local issues no matter how minor they are. Thus
the local SMOs show relatively less flexible in selecting
issues: they cannot only concentrate on those beneficial issues
while giving up those trivial matters.
Two logics of development for the SMOs can be discerned. One
logic is first to consolidate a local base and then seek ways to
expand outward. That is to build up a reservoir of local
supporters through long-term serving in a chosen constituency,
then diffuses its services to nearby districts. Only when
accumulating enough reputation and popularity in that place, the
SMO will consider outstretching to other targets. Otherwise, it
dare not take risks to invest its resources at other spots. In
light of these, this kind of development is slow and rather
conservative and passive toward expansion. The methods of
expansion are: 1. forming symmetric coalition with SMOs in
adjacent districts or constituencies, in which none of the SMOs
is superior to other joining partners 2. outspreading membership
networks and claiming representativeness to nearby residents.
This kind of enlargement is characterized by its concentric
pattern in which the power base diffusing outward from a center.
Since this strategy of development emphasizes the solidarity of
the members, so it is more favorable to those inclusive SMOs
which demand heavy commitment and close personal relations among
the members. The other logic of development is first to expand
and then seek ways to consolidate. That is to incorporate as many
members as possible and build up a popularity in the shortest
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time. Then the SMO will strengthen its power base in different
districts through strict organizational discipline. Obviously,
this kind of development is much faster and more initiative. The
methods of incorporation consist: I. intruding to those districts
where the leaderships are not well organized or atomized, 2.
coopting some capable members in some preexisting groups in order
to disorganize them and then absorbing the rest, 3. forming
branches or new organizations in the target districts so as to
impress the residents and gain their supports, 4. nominating its
members to run election in the preferred districts in order to
establish a popularity through the campaign activities. This
pattern of expansion is characterized by its scattered and
opportunity-seeking nature because the districts chosen are not
determined by their geographical closeness, but rather the chance
of penetration. It is more favorable for those exclusive SM.Os
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which demand a rapid growth. In Tuen Mun MP seems to employ the
latter way of development whereas the local SMOs use the former
one. MP's option can be justified by its political nature. Since
its overriding goal is to struggle in the race of inheriting
central power, timing is a momentous determinant to its share of
power. If MP can develop into a strong political group before
the introduction of the LegCo direct election, it can get more
seats than any other competitors. Moreover, its bargaining power
with its competitors in forming alliance will be much enhanced.
Furthermore, MP recognizes that the potentiality of development
among the local SMOs is very limited. Cooperating with them
would only drag MP into immobilism due to their non-political and
local-oriented natures. While the local SMOs give the priority to
raising the living quality of the residents and none of their
leaders cherish the LegCo office, so sensibly they prefer the
former development strategy. As perceived by one of them,
Once MP came to Tuen Mun, they had planned to prepare
for the LegCo direct election, but we even did not know
what DB election was. This implies there exists a gap
of perception of the HK political development between
our resident pressure groups and their political
organization. Our mentality of politics is lagging
quite far behind theirs. What we think as immoral and
inappropriate are regarded as non-moral and inevitable
by them. Perhaps, the reason why we find them
unacceptable is that we are reluctant to be pure
politicians and we don't want to only be treated as
their instruments for elections either.
According to Tilly,(1978:88) a tourtoici typology can be
applied to describe the group strategies of the SMOs: 1. the
zealots who set an extremely high value on some collective good
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such that they will attempt to achieve that good even when the
cost is higher than the reward 2. the misers, who value the
resources they already hold so highly that hardly any available
collective good can draw them into expending their mobilized
resources on collective action 3. the run-of-the-mill contenders
are those who aim for a limited set of collective goods, they
will make the minimum expenditure of resources necessary for the
acquisition of these goods, and remain inactive when the cost
cannot be compensated by the reward 4. the opportunists are
those who strive to maximize their net return regardless of which
collective goods they acquire. The local SMOs in Tuen Mun are
typically the zealots. They value the goal of genuinely serving
for the residents so high that they can even sacrifice their
political prospect. They insist on the priority of local to
territory affairs as well as refraining to use some immoral'
strategies to increase their political capitals, for instance,
using media to promote one's image rather than actively involved
in local affairs or splitting other SMOs in order to occupy their
power bases. MP is the run-of-the-mill who would only interfere
in those affairs valued high and ensuring a positive return.
Considering the traditional groups, originally they were the
misers, they valued their existing harmonious political
relationships too much that they were reluctant to articulate the
new immigrants' interests so as- to avoid any conflicts which
might violate their relationship with the officials or other
famous persons. Nevertheless, their defeat in 85 and 86 elections
made them change their strategies and became the opportunists.
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Tilly proposed that every political system rewards the
opportunists more than the run-of-the-mill and the zealots.
(1978:89) The latter chapter will explore the strike-back of the
traditional groups and the crisis of the democratic SMOs.
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IV. Coming Crisis of the New Groups
A. The Changing Nature of the Traditional Groups
1. The Changes of Mobilization Strategies
In response to fading of power, the traditional groups are
earnestly to adjust their strategies as well as mentalities in
order to retain their diminishing political capitals. After their
failures in 85 and 86 elections, they had reflected on the
factors conducive to the success of the new groups. They
concluded if they wanted to revitalize themselves, they had to
re-establish their relationships with the new immigrants even at
the expense of their good relationship with the officials. In
order to accomplish this, they carried out several blueprints.
Firstly, they set up a joint DB member office. The functions of
this office are: 1. providing a place for them to gather and
exchange ideas on the local and territory affairs constantly 2.
acting as a headquarter for them to ally or contact with other
territory political groups' and closely related LegCo members 3.
doing as an information center which collects all the related
newspaper cuttings, magazine articles and the complaints of Tuen
Mun residents through the mass media 4. performing as a campaign
headquarter which allocates the resources and requests nominated
supports from renowned figures for their members. Indeed, the
1 None of these groups are democratic SNOs, most of them are
conservative political organization, like HK Progressive Society
and leftist organizations.
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ideal of forming joint office is imitated from MP, which has a
central headquarter constituted by a groups of intellectuals
providing information and advice as well as designing long-term
political strategy. From a leading rural member, although Tuen
Mun is still their most concerned district, it does not deny the
fact that they will expand their power base to other districts.
Moreover, they have close connection with the leftist
organizations and the HK Progressive Society, though their
cooperations are still ad hoc and issue-oriented, this does not
imply further collaboration cannot be advanced. Secondly, for the
elected members, they set up their own DB member offices2 in
their constituencies. The functions of this constituency-based
office are: 1. a place for the residents, especially those in the
public housing estates, complain and voice out their opinions
2. a permanent place for them to contact the residents all the
time 3. providing welfare and recreational activities, like
students tutorial classes and picnics. The idea of setting up the
DB member office is also copied from the SMOs, originally, they
quite reprobated this,3 but now they not only adopt all the
functions performed by those offices of the SMOs' members, they
even annex traditional practice (providing minor welfare and
`. The idea of setting up constituency-based DB member office is
first suggested- by the new groups and it was thought as
unnecessary by the traditional jroups, see DB first meeting
minutes on April 19, 1985.
See DB first meeting minute on April 19, 1985.
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recreational activities) on it. Thirdly, they assiduously improve
their public image through increasing public exposure: 1.
publishing newsletters and specials to tell the residents what
they are proceeding or have finished in tackling the local
affairs; 2. organizing researches and opinion surveys to
aggregate the needs of the residents; 3. writing to the press or
calling press conferences to bring out the dissatisfaction
related with the government 4. joining many public recreational
functions or holding ceremonies like the Dragon Boat Race and
Tuen Mun Festival. Fourthly, they imitate all the electoral
campaign strategies employed by the pressure groups: 1.
intensively doing door-to-door canvassing and preparing well in
the DB or RC candidates consulting forums; 2. using electronic
media and huge propaganda materials to impress the voters 3.
mobilizing as many campaign volunteers as possible from the MACs
and local traditional associations 4. forming alliance with the
leftist organization and utilizing these associations' membership
networks and materials to enhance their chance of winning; 5.
inviting territorially famous persons like Maria Tam4 to
personally involve in their campaign activities. Fifthly, they
make compromise on who running the elections to avoid unnecessary
competition. Finally, they put forth the revitalization scheme
through: 1. prompting the elder or the incapable to withdraw from
the front line and give chances to the younger; 2. coopting
4. A ExCo and LegCo member and chairlady of HR Progressive
Society.
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educated persons or professionals other than those from the MACs
and traditional associations 3. institutionalizing the Joint DB
Members Office as the master-mind in designing the programs and
electoral campaigns aiming at the 91 LegCo direct election. Above
all, they change previous strategy principally due to their
opportunist nature. They seek every chance of improving the
livelihood of the residents in order to aggravate their certainty
in getting power, even at the expense of their good relationship
with the officials. By examining all the available DB meetings
minutes, the traditional groups leaders seldom challenged the
authority openly in the meetings during 82-85 period. But this
had been changed after 1985, they began openly attacking the
officials and expressed regrets when they found the officials
were mal-functioning. Nevertheless, they continued some
traditional practice as well: inviting them to some formal
banquets, recreational functions or overseas study tours for
official reasons, like studying Light Rail Transit and city
planning. Quoted from one of the traditional leaders,
The modification of attitudes toward the government
officials is mainly due to the different practice
between the younger and the elder. In the past, we were
dominated by the elder and we also respected them, so
we didn't violate their traditional practice. But now,
the elder seldom concerns the DB affairs and let us do
that, thus we can change the ways as we like.
Considering their means of articulating residents interests,
all- the elected traditional groups DB members accept using
radical ways to exert pressure on officials, even they. know most
of the policies are central decisions such that the chance of
success is very low. Same as the pressure group they raise the
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radicalness in accordance wit}1 the seriousness of the issues and
the insisting manner of the officials. First, they will try to
contact the officials personally see whether the issues can be
resolved informally. Later they will bring the issues into the
agenda of meetings through drafting some discussion papers. If
no action is taken by the government, then they will use the
threat of embarrassment: open attacks in the DB meetings,
association acts, press conference, or any ways that produce
uncomfortable publicity for the authority. The last resort is the
mass protest. The most illustrative example is the Vietnamese
refugee incident, in which they not only openly attacked the
official in the DB meeting, wrote to press, and held a public
forum to arouse residents' concern, but also mobilized the
residents in a housing estate nearby the open camp of the
refugees to organize a self-security troop.
Apart from being deliberately adjusting themselves to the
new environment, they also endeavor to reduce the potency of the
new camp _n several ways. Firstly, they minimize the formal means
of representing people's interests in DB through occupying all
the chairman positions of the sub-committees, especially those
closely related to residents' livelihood, the Traffic and
Transport Committer, Social Services Committee and Culture,
Renreation and Sport Committee. Preyiously, they were unaware of
the importance of the posts but now they reeognize that being
the chairmen, ones can not only formally become the spokesmen who
have relatively more public exposure, but also may gain most of
the credits when accompilshing some tasks. Secondly, they seek
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thances to attack the new groups' members as irresponsible and
not truly helping residents openlys in order to ruin their public
images. Thirdly, through their plentiful. resources, they try to
monopolize all the opportunities of public exposure in the
recreational activities and ceremonies. Finally, since they see
the new camp splitting into two segments, so they strive to
incorporate the local SMOs' members to against the territory SMC,
which they regard as their main rival.
Since the only aim of the opportunists is to make profits,
in order to maintain their existing power, they will form
coalition with their powerful counterparts when they think that
it is impossible to get rid of them. However, once they have
consolidated their power or find their coalition partner no
longer dependable, they may break the alliance and contest with
their former cohorts. Accordingly, the traditional groups once
discover that the success in elections does not depend on the
goodwill of the government, on the one hand, they appear to be
at least not pro-government, if not anti-government in order to
get trust from the residents. On the other hand, they maintain a
pleasant relationship with the officials because the officials
can still possess absolute decision making power and affect the
5. For example, in a RC candidates consulting forum, they
attacked one of the new groups candidate living too far away from
Tuen Mun and gave evidence to illustrate him not genuinel
fighting for the interests of the residents.
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election results indirectly. In their relations with the new
groups, when they have sufficient resources and power base to
contend with the SMOs' members, they will not consider forming
any coalition. On the contrary, when they find some unbeatable
rivals, they will try every means to absorb them. One of the SMOs
member said,
In the 88 DB election, as they cannot find any
eligible candidate to contest with me, they ask me to
form an election alliance with Mr. X (a current
incumbent with traditional background, my remark)
though Mr. X had fierce confrontation with me about
campaign affairs in the last election. They do this so
that they can avoid me to bring my colleague to compete
with him.
Their coopting strategy is very different from that of the
MP, because MP's incorporation is constrained by its claimed
ideal of democracy. Although MP also seek for power, it will only
incorporate those with similar ideology such as advocating 88
direct LegCo election and against the establishment of Daya Bay
nuclear plant. This is a critical distinction between the
run-of-the-mill and opportunist. Since the power base of the
traditional force roots in Tuen Mun, so the traditional leaders
put more effort in the local affairs. In this aspect, they are
similar to the local SMOs' leaders. But the local SMOs' leaders
still maintain a distance from them because of the ideological
cleavage. As a result, the zealot nature draws the local SMOs
into a isolated situation. In the long run, the local SMOs face
with a serious survival problem.
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2. New Forms of Clientelism
Two different approaches can be found in the literature of
the clientelism. One views patron-client relationship as a
social relation between two individuals desiring mutual personal
advantages, in which one mobilizes or obtains political support
from the other through the use of patronage. The other
perspective sees patronage as an attribute of the system and no
longer regards clients as individuals, but social or territorial
groups which trade off their votes for the goods and services the
political machine provides. (Tarkowski 1981:58) Scott also
observed that a secular trend in the nature of patron-client ties
in Southeast Asia occurred because of the penetration of the
local arena by an intrusive national economy and national
political system. The patron-client ties changed from previously
individual-based with more affective and more persistent nature
to a group-based with more instrumental and less durable one.
The most important engine behind the shift in patron-client ties
is the introduction of the nation-wide electoral system. The
electoral competition not only invites the national political
groups to establish a network of links extending down to the
local level, but also politicizes the local patrons by providing
an chance of upward mobility in the political institution for
them. Nevertheless, the electoral system also weakens the
original power base of the local patron through: 1. improving the
clients' bargaining position by adding their trade-off
resources, the rotes; 2. attracting more both internal and
external contenders to compete with the original patrons; 3.
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elevating their original washier opponents' contesting ability if
they form coalition with a stronger external partner. (Scott
1972:136-42) In order to win the election, the patrons are eager0
to develop as wide a circle of clients as possible, since their
resources are limited, they would stress the flow of benefits to
the groups rather than to the individuals. Accordingly, they find
great interest in the welfare and development of a neighborhood,
group or association which will reciprocate with political
support. As a result, a collective rather than an individual
patron-client tie will be founded. However, the patrons can only
cultivate a limited number of contacts with the potential clients
directly, so they relied on some brokers to expand their
networks. Consequently, a pyramidal web of patron-client network
will be formed with the most powerful politician at the apex, a
huge dependent clients at the bottom and mediated by a number of
secondary patrons (brokers). (Nelson 1979:188-91) Political
machine is the most institutionalized form of patron-client
pyramid. It is a political organization having a leadership, a
hierarchy and disciplined members. It has three fundamental
characteristics. Firstly, it is non-ideological and non-
programmatic in drawing up explicit, consistent, and integrated
schemes to address the problems of urban poverty and growth. It
heavily relies on material incentives, including legal advice,
aid in contacting government aria symbolic -favors, to win the
support of followers. Secondly, once it is in power and lack of
strong opposition, machine politicians will only mobilize a
sufficient vote to win without any compulsion to turn out a
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large electoral participation. They prefer maintaining g the
support.loyalty of machine workers to mobilizing popular
Finally, in a successful machine, the patron-client linkages are
organized into a centralized system, with a clear-cut head and a
stable and disciplined hierarchy of workers. (Nelson 1979:192-5))
The traditional groups also have such change in their
pattern of clientelism, a shift from individual to group
patronage. This is mainly due to the significant increase of new
immigrants and the introduction of popular election. The increase
of the residents constrains the patronage capacity of them, while
the election and its implication of being vehicle for mobility to
LegCo invite the rival of the political group. In response, the
traditional leaders did modify their individual-based practice
through coopting the MACS' members or local associations'
leaders, and treated them as brokers to dispense their patronage
to the common residents. Thus one can easily find that most of
the MACs are on the side of the traditional force. The most
prominent example was the case happened in 86 RC election in
which thirteen MACs' chairmen collectively resigned due to their
discontent with the residents not voting for the traditional
candidate they recommended.6 However, the 85 and 86 elections
demonstrated the incapability of these intermediates, this
propelled the traditional leaders to reflect on their ways of
distributing their patronage. In oomparing.With the strategies of
6 See Oriental Daily News on March 9, 1986.
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the democratic camp, they concluded that: 1. they cannot only
rely on the brokers and ignore the direct contacts with the
residents 2. they neglect the importance of the complementary y
role of propaganda in delivering their patronage, consequently
the residents seldom know what they have done for them 3. the
adjustment of shifting to group-based patronage is not enough 4.
they often mis-allocate their resources to those fields which are
not urgently needed by the new immigrants because of lacking
communication with the people and the ineffectiveness of the
brokers 5. their resources are so limited to afford the demands
of the people because most of the requests involve central
governmental decisions. In order to adapt.to the new political
environment, a number of changes are embraced in their original
clientelism. First, they collaborate with the resourceful leftist
organizations, the New Territories West District Resident
Association7 in the district level and the New Territories
Association of Society in the territory level. Second, they set
up DB member offices to provide more direct patronage and
communication channels to the residents to compensate the
inadequacy of the brokers. For instance, one of the traditional
informant stated,
Once I was elected as the DB member, I started to
carry out my own meeting-people scheme. Moreover, I
individually provide free medical services to the
-residents in my constituency so as to reciprocate their
supports because I am supported by a number of Chinese
7. At least two of the current elected DB members are the members
of its executive committees.
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medical practitioners. Furthermore, I organize a number
of tutorial classes and drawing classes to the students
with a symbolic fee of $30 per month. I think there are
about 200 students attending these classes every month.
In addition, through the office, I can directly help
the residents to resolve their personal problems, like
finding nearby schools for their children, without any
help from the government. You know the distributive
policy of allocating school seat is very rigid, they
cannot rely on the officials' assistance, but, unlike
the other DB members, I can help them through my
friends who are the school principals.
The function of DB member offices not only provide direct
patronage, but also recruit a number of helpful clients who give
direct assistance in the election. For the above informant, some
of his campaign workers are recruited from the teachers of his
tutorial classes. Third, the establishment of the office is not
restricted to the DB members only, the non-DB incumbents will
also set up resident serving associations in order to establish a
patronage network before they run the elections. For example, one
of the 89 RC candidate who hold no public office set up such kind
of society half year before the election. The services provided
includes recreational and welfare activities as well as legal
assistance and receiving complaints of livelihood problems.
Fourth, in addition to the tangible material provision, they
generalize the forms of patronage via providing intangible
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patronage,9 like publicly addressing the aversion of the public
and organizing the people to fight for their interests. Fifth,
in contrast to their previous ignorance of the importance of
making public known what they have done, they unremittingly
propagate their performance via publishing newsletters, opinion
poll reports and listing all their accomplishments in their
9. Tangible patronage involves actual transfers of material
reward, lime money and services, but intangible patronage does
not distribute any material benefits, rather, intangible
patronage gives some psychological satisfaction to the clients. I
regard addressing public interests as a form of intangible
patronage because even though these actions may not really bring
the desired outcomes for the people, but they can give a
psychological satisfaction of releasing their dislikes and a hope
of success. However, the intangible patronage should be
distinguished from the similar practices of the pressure groups
because it does not contain any elements of raising the political
consciousness of the clients. Once the patron perceives these
actions may deteriorate his power, he will cease to do that.
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electoral pamphlets.
As the patrons themselves can be the clients of another more
powerful patron, the traditional leaders can be viewed as the
clients of the colonial government in the past. However, w when
decolonization took place and the feeling of the overwhelming
forces of both the leftwing organizations and some of the central
conservative groups, they begin to find another patron rather
than the fading colonial government. One of the local SMOs'
leader said,
"Mr. A (a prominent traditional leader, my remark) once
told me not to so radical in opposing the construction
of the Daya Bay nuclear plant, otherwise you would
enrage the Chinese government as she will be the hidden
ruler of HK in the future."
Another traditional informant also predicted that the
victory will go to the leftist force in the 91 LegCo direct
election, neither the democratic nor the rural groups have chance
to win. All these show a irresistible feeling of the leftwing
domination in future is really present in the mind of the
traditional leaders.9 As for the local groups, clientelism is a
strategy to maximize influence at the political center in order
9 According to a Heung Yee Kuk source, the Kuk did not have an
official political stand, and all in all it is a politically
ambiguous body. However, with reference to the chairman of the
New Territories Association of Societies, he believed that many
Kuk members were pro-Beijing. For details, see HK Standard on
June 5, 1988.
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to better insulate from unfavorable public policies whereas for
the central groups it is a way to maximize the local vote-getting
capabilities to enhance its weight at the center, (Lemarchand
1981:23) the coalition between the Tuen Mun traditional grouPs
and the leftwing organizations and some central influential
conservative groups is perceivable. Being an opportunist, if the
traditional groups want to effectively affect the government
policies in their passion so as to increase their patronage
capacity, the aids of the powerful central groups, which aim at
the LegCo domination via strong local back-up, are inevitable.
Unlike their democratic counterparts, they do not have the
ideological burden, thus they can comfortably cooperate with the
emerging overriding forces. So far one can see a patronage
network which links up some central groups with the leftist
background and the Tuen Mun traditional leaders, though not yet
institutionally shaped, is at least evolving.
Aside from their external clientelistic linkage, internally
they attempt to institutionalize themselves into a political
machine. Nevertheless, as the colonial government still control a
rather authoritarian decision making power in formulating both
central and local policies, the traditional force lacks the
dispensable capacity to reward the public. Moreover, though
frequent interaction and cooperation are common, the traditional
force is still an atomized entity. Without some part-like
organizational supports, the possibility of becoming a machine is
quite low. Since the political machine is characterized by
centralized system, a clear-cut head and disciplined workers, all
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these involve the problems of power distribution, the willingness
of sacrificing autonomy and sufficient sanction capacity, its
fragmented nature does impose further obstacle. Although with
mountainous difficulties to the formation of a machine, the Joint
DB Member Office, the evolving leadership'0 and the more and more
integrated works are all signifying this tendency and intention.
B. The Present Political Structure in Tuen Mun
1. Factionalism
In studying the local politics in Tuen Nun, the term
`faction' rather than `organization' is more appropriate to
describe the groups involved because though some of these groups
have a formal organizations, they actually lack the definite
properties of corporateness. The factionalism in Tuen Nun is well
known in the public, however, the number of factions has not
yet clearly identified. This may due to the constant process of
10 The central design of campaign strategy, the establishment of
the joint office, the process of selecting appropriate candidates
and the common political practice are all manifesting the
evolution of a leadership.
11. The factionalism in Tuen Mun was quite intensively reported
in press, see HK Standard on January 4, 1988, February 8, 1988,
and June 5, 1988 South China Morning Post on December 27, 1984
and November 14, 1988 Wah Kiu Yat Po on January 4, 88 Ming Po
on January 14, 1988 HK Daily News on February 4, 1988 and HK
Economic Journal on January 4, 1988.
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fission and fusion among these factions.12 according to Nicholas,
(1966:57-8) factions have five characteristics: 1. they are
conflict groups, no matter they are visible to public or not 2.
they are political groups in the sense of their nature of
contending public power 3. they are not corporate groups because
they lack the permanence of any of other groups 4. faction
members are recruited by a leader 5. faction members are
recruited on diverse principles as the leader often makes use of
all possible view to draw supporters into his faction. However,
Nicholas's definition is no so paradigmatic, in Spiro's study of
factionalism in village Burma, (1968:419) he found two features
that were not identified by Nicholas. Firstly, factional
behaviors were bounded in a relatively small arena, direct
confrontations were exclusively verbal and encounters were almost
non-existent. Secondly, although interfactional conflict existed,
factional opponents maintained a facade of mutual friendliness in
those occasions in which interaction was demanded or unavoidable.
In challenging the assumption of non-corporate nature of faction,
iz For the changeability of the nature of factions because of
their constant fission and fusion, see Aronoff's analysis of the
Israel Labor Parties (1978).
126
Aronoff adopted Smith's definition13 of corporate groups and
insisted on ranging corporateness in a continuum rather simply
dichotomizing it into mutually contradictory categories as
corporate versus non-corporate. (Aronoff 1978:111) Beller and
Belloni (1978:419-20) defined faction as "any relatively
organized group that exists within the context of some other
group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for
power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part."
They further distinguished three types of factions
organizationally: 1. factional cliques or tendencies which
composed of individuals who have some interest in common
(ideological, policy, material, personal, or other), but who are
not at all formally organized in pursuit of that 'coal or
interest 2. personal or client-group factions which have true
organization, in the specialized form of the unique, personally
recruited and maintained bond of leader and follower 3.
organizational or institutionalized factions which have acquired
a significant number of the features of a corporate group. Their
organizations do not rest on the informal personal recruitment
and exchange, but consist instead of more formal recruiting
procedures, being subject to formal rules and having names or
13. To challenge some theorists overemphasizing only some of the
elements in defining, corporateness, he proposed to use all the
features of perpetuity, boundedness, determinate membership,
identity, autonomy, organization, procedure, and common affairs
to define corporate group. (Smith 1966)
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nonpersonal symbols for the groups.
In examining the voting results of selecting sub-committees'
chairmen and the RC representative from DB, the formation of
factions can be evidently illustrated:
Table 13
Voting Results in 88 DB for electing
RC Representative and Committee Chairmen
Background No. of votes absent orOffice of Candidate obtained invalid vote
Pressure Group 6
RC Representative
Pressure Group 6 0
Traditional 16
Chairman of Pressure Group 12 0
Culture, Recreation Traditional 16
& Sports Committee
Chairman of
Environmental Pressure Group 12 115Improvement & District Traditional
Development Committee
Chairman of Social Pressure Group 19 2
Services Committee Traditional 14
Chairman of Traffic Pressure Group 12 2
& Transport Committee Traditional 14
From above table, two camps can be roughly observed: the
traditional camp and the democratic camp. However, further
examining the discussion papers prepared by the democratic camp,
one can note that it is further divided into two factions.
Although on some broad issues like 88 LegCo direct election and
against Daya Bay nuclear plant., the democratic camp members can
compromise to submit a single paper, but in most cases, the two
factions separately draft their own papers even en on the same
issues. This kind of splitting can be traced back to their
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affiliation with territory or local SMOs as analyzed in chapter
three. Considering the traditional force, after changing their
strategy, they began preparing the discussion papers, complaining
to press and other similar actions, however, the appointed
members seldom join their elected counterparts. It is because
they have different sources of attaining the offices. While the
elected members rely on the electorate in their constituency, the
appointed members however depend on the goodwill of the
government, so they will show a more pro-government orientation.
As one of traditional leaders discerned,
"The press often classifies me as one of the rural
force, indeed I am independent and neutral rather than
belonging to any organizations. I have close connection
with the rural force mainly because I have lived in
Tuen Mun for thirty years and have friendship with most
of the rural leaders. In addition, I have common stands
and opinions with them. Actually, if you insist me
telling how many cliques are existing in Tuen Mun, my
answer is five. The traditional force is divided into
two: the Tuen Mun Rural Committee and some independent
members. The new force is divided into three groups:
Meeting Point, Tuen Mun Forth Viewer and Tsuen Wai
Society, and some unaffiliated members who had left
MP."
Another traditional leader sees there are only two factions:
the more atomized traditional faction and the democratic
faction. Nevertheless, a local SMO's member has different view on
the dispersed nature of Tuen Mun political forces,
"There are four factions in Tuen Mun, two in
democratic camp and two in traditional camp. The
traditional camp is divided into old and young groups.
The old group members are mainly the appointed DB
members with closer tie with the :arigfinal inhabitants
while the elected ones constitute the young group that
has close connection with the leftwing organizations.
Al though they are broken up into two groups, they can
still come together in contesting with us. Therefore, I
often treat them as a coherent force rather than two.
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Moreover, I think it is a pity that our two divisions
are hard to work together in challenging them due to
our past unresolved conflicts."
After all, analyzing the problem of faction in different
level may make the picture more clear. At the level of the whole
political structure of Tuen Mun, two distinct factions can be
delineated: the traditional and democratic factions. The boundary
between them is very clear because their distance in ideology of
promoting democracy and attitudes toward China make them
difficult to come together. However, at the group level, each
faction is further smashed into two divisions: the elder and the
younger groups in the traditional faction, the local SMOs and the
territory SMO in the democratic faction. Nevertheless, separating
their internal divisions is much more complicated by their
constant fission and fusion in different issues, especially for
the traditional leaders because of their opportunist nature and
the stress of internal harmony. The visibility of the internal
dissensions in the democratic faction is greater than that of
traditional faction. In two issues concerning the electoral
affairs and the problem of Vietnamese refugees,14 the internal
cleavages between the local SMOs and MP attract much media
coverage. With respect to the faction structure, the democratic
faction was originally a electoral tendency in which the
14. In which the two groups have different alternatives to
resolve the problem and involve direct -confrontation via the
press, see HK Economic Journal on December 29, 1988 and February
19, 1989, and HK Economic Times on September ??, 1988.
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like-minded individuals banded together to support particular
candidates to challenge the power of the traditional force. As
described by Beller and Belloni (1978:422-4), the organizational
leadership is ad hoc and hierarchical chain of command is
nonexistent in this tendency. Moreover, its duration of life is
quite short and highly susceptible to internal division into
subcliques. The traditional faction is typical a client-group
faction in which chain of command is always limited to a vertical
rather than a horizontal pattern. Furthermore the faction leaders
will discourage any horizontal links among his followers,
otherwise it will inclines toward an organizational faction and
weaken the group's cohesiveness. (Beller and Belloni 1978:424-5)
Nevertheless, seeing the opportunity of political prospect
created by the 1997 incident, both the democratic and the
traditional factions intend to institutionalize themselves in
order to catch up with this critical historical moment for
political upward mobility. Before becoming real political
organizations, consolidating political alignment with the other
like-minded factions as well as within the faction seem to be a
prerequisite. Notwithstanding, the process of strengthening the
Political base for coalitions is dependent on the faction
structure.
Lawler and Bacharach's model (198?) can help anaiyzing the
dynamics- of-internal political alignments between the traditional
and democratic factions. In accordance with the model, there are
tjtiO political processes undei 1•ing coal i tion formation: 1.
absorption which refers to the process by which a given actor
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within the coalition essentially envelops other actors, thereby
making others less distinguishable from itself 2. insulation
which generates more distinct discrepancy between those within
and those outside the coalition. Moreover, there are two
organizational factors which are critical for analyzing the
sources and consequences of insulation and absorption: the
number of actors involved and the power differentiation among
these actors. The more the number of actors involved, absorption
will be more favorable to insulation in forming coalition to
advance one's-power while the greater power differentiation among
actors will increase the tendency toward absorption and decrease
the trend toward insulation. Using these two parameters, Lawler
and Bacharach constructed a fourfold typology of political
alignment:
Table 14
Type of Political Alignment by the Number of Actors and
the Power Differentiation Among the Actors
Power Differentiation
Low High
Number Fey Politics of Politics of
of .7onfrontation Patronage
actors
Many Politics of Politics of
Crisis Cooptation
Politics of confrontation has the following features: 1. it
develops within a highly decentralized organization with
relatively few =interest groups 2. it de -elops from the
insulation processes 3. alliances are relatively- stable and pit
a few major subgroups agains€ one another 4. the conflict
between subgroups is manifested across a large range of issues
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5. no single group can dominate the organization as a whole; 6.
it gives rise to persistent but patterned, predictable, and
manageable conflicts. Politics of crisis is characterized by: 1.
it develops within a highly decentralized organization in chaos;
2. it develops from the insulation tactics; 3. alliances within
which are unstable and fluid; 3. it can only address relatively
specific, temporally bound issues and each issue seems to create
a new set of alliances; 4. the conflicts tend to be unpatterned,
unpredictable and unmanageable. Politics of patronage has several
properties: 1. it develops in a highly centralized organization;
2. it develops from absorption tactics;3. very stable alliances
crosscut higher and lower levels of the organization hierarchy;
4. the appearance of little or no conflict between subgroups
because of the ability of high-power actors to smooth over
differences and subtly force consensus on a wide range of issues;
5. conflicts tends to be attributed to the personalities of the
individuals involved rather than to the divergent coalitions and
the conflicts are kept in the background when they do appear.
Politics of cooptation is distinguished by: 1. it has its sources
from the absorption processes; 2. ,oderately stable alliances
which are subject to continual bargaining; 3. bargaining is more
explicit than politics of politics of patronage but more implicit
than politics of confrontation; 4. the manipulation of symbols of
unity lends legitimacy to the relationship among actors and
deemphasizes their divergent interests. The above scheme leads to
the following analysis of Tuen Mun local politics. First, at the
macro level, between the traditional and the democratic factions,
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there is a low power differentiation, hence the politics of
confrontation is predicted. Although they often have similar
views toward the residents' livelihood problems, they seldom
form an actual coalition other than uncoordinated common actions
in condemning the government officials because of their keen
electoral competition, uncompromising mentality, and their
divergent views on political development. Second, in concerning
within the democratic camp, though the territory SMO is a highly
organized entity, in fact, its' local power is similar to those
local SMOs' no matter in terms of human and material resources,
hence their power differentiation is rather low. Although there
are three local SMOs, under the threat of the exclusion of MP,
they can be treated as a allied group rather three separate,
uncoordinated organizations. In this sense, there are only two
major forces within this board democratic coalition, politics of
confrontation is again expected. As predicted, the coalition
between relatively equal powers will pose a problem of long-term
stability, thus though the democratic faction can form an united
front in 85 and 86 elections, their coalition eventually smashed
in 1988. Third, about the traditional camp, there are only two
groups involved, but there exists a high power differentiation,
hence politics of patronage is created. Since patronage politics
is characterized by its coercive nature made by the wide power
disparity, even some lower-power allies discontented with.the
higher-power actors, they seldom do some deviant actions. This
difference in the forms of political alignment explains shy the
traditional faction seems to be more united than the democratic
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faction. As commented by one SMO's leader, he find that the
traditional faction can always reach a consensus regardless of
its internal dissimilarity. Fourth, in analyzing the local SMOs,
politics of confrontation once again characterizes their
interactions. A former RC elected member, who belongs to the
local SMOs faction, in answering the question why he did not run
for the 88 RC election, he complained that,
"Since, like last RC election, MP will not help me, so
I must rely on the other democratic groups. When I
asked them to help me increase my reputation in order
to ensure victory, they insist that they cannot only
concern my public exposure while neglecting theirs.
This makes me very disappointed, so I decided not to
run this time."
Distrust seems to be pervasive among the local SMOs as well
as between the local SMOs and the territory SMO and between the
traditional faction and the democratic faction, it is the result
of the politics of confrontation because all of them fear that
once the other groups become dominant, their own survival will be
greatly threatened. Fifth, the cooptational strategy may be
viewed as the logical form of coalition within MP, because it
feels itself stronger than other local groups. But the success of
cooptation depends on the inducements that offered by the
higher-power actors. However, MP is not a resourceful
organization, it cannot provide needed resources to its member.
On the contrary, it demands its members to submit a certain
amount of their DB members' allowance to support its own
expenditure. One of the informant who had left MP commented that
it is unreasonable for MP to demand party-like obligation from
its members while do not provide enough material aids in return.
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The time for MP to develop into a party-like political group
before 1997 is very short, so it must coopt as many members as
possible. Yet its resources are very limited and most of the
higher-power leaders have only symbolic resources which are
inconvertible into material resources, so the lower-power members
hardly receive any concrete assistance from them. As a result,
the seemingly high power differentiation is actually a low one.
Along with the fact that there are only a few MP members who are
intensively involved in Tuen Mun politics, thus instead of
cooptational politics, politics of confrontation is dominant.
Consensus is built upon successful persuasive argumentation
rather than material inducement, but MP's political strategy of
excluding the local SMOs hard to convince some of its members.
Consequently these members leave MP in response to its exclusive
strategy as well as lacking material supports. Sixth, as the
elder group in the traditional camp withdraw from the first
line,15 a transitory period appears. Since the power
is The elder group is willing to withdraw mainly because they
are successful persuaded by the younger and their traditional
political practices had proved to be failed. Moreover, most of
them do not cherish any higher political positions, so they give
ways to the more energetic and politically ambitious persons. The
most illustrative example is that one of the elder who had run
for last RC election was convinced to abandon the idea to run
this time and support a younger professional to replace him.
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differentiation is lowered as some powerful leaders less involved
in the local politics, and the younger group is quite dispersed
and with many ambitious actors, therefore patronage politics is
replaced by a crisis one. Since in crisis politics, chaos
characterize the interactions among the younger leaders, many
differences seem to be occur without consistent patterns over a
multitude of issues. However, because of the common external
enemies and the pursuit of self-protection, the internal
conflicts are avoided and a minimal consensus can still be
reached. Later, the bloc alliance with the leftist organizations
not only makes some of the members acquire more resourceful than
the others, but also help restoring and stabilizing the previous
pattern of patronage politics. After all, at the group level, the
confrontational politics sketches out the nature of the SMOs
while the patronage politics outlines that of the traditional
faction.
In his study of the Chinese Communist Party, Nathan
(1978:394-9) listed out a number of peculiarities of factional
politics: 1. Since factions are incapable to crush their rivals,
a code of civility arises which circumscribes the nature of
conflict. 2. Defensive political strategies predominate over
initiative to destroy their rivals because of their incapability
and their immediate concern of reserving their own survivals. 3.
Even a faction take this initiative, it relies on secret
preparations and surprise offensive. 4. In face of such an
initiative, the defensive orientation encourage the other
factions to unite against the initiative. Thus it tend to block
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the emergence of strong leading faction. 5. However, factional
alliances cannot remain stable because today's enemy may have to
be tomorrow's ally. 6. It is virtually impossible for factions to
make ideological agreement a prime condition for alliance
because which may impede their future coalition. 7. When
decisions are to made for the whole system, they are made by
consensus. 8. There is a cycle of formation and decline of
consensus. 9. The resources with which factions carry out
political conflicts are the personal resources of the individual
members. 10. Factions adopt rigid and minutely defined
ideological positions, exaggerate small differences on abstract
questions, and stress the purity of their own motives in order to
provide a rationale for continuing the struggles. 11. A rather
limited number of factions may occur due to the equilibrium
mechanism which will minimize the degree of power imbalance among
the factions. 12. The factional elites are united by one shared
interest: that the resources for which they are struggling should
be allocated among themselves rather than to some external
forces. 13. Within the factional elites, it is taboo to question
the principle of legitimacy on which the faction base their claim
to a role in the larger society. 14. Immobilism characterizes the
Iecision making process of the factional system. 15. The
factional system is extremely stable. However, not all the above
:haracteristics are found in Tuen °lun because there exist
2onsiderable discrepancies between the two political contexts no
natter in terms of scope of political power involved or the
?olitical systems operating. But Nathan's analysis can give some
138
starting points for
discussion. Since Nathan neglected the all
the ideological factors involved and only started with a power
struggle perspective, the sixth feature is highly doubtful. In
Tuen Nun the ideological orientation of the democratic faction is
too strong to allow its members to coalesce with any traditional
faction members, especially in the electoral affairs, though the
traditional faction had attempted to do so. Additionally, though
shifting alliances actually occur, but they are only restricted
to the boundary within the two broad factions. Therefore, despite
any fission and fusion taken place frequently, the bi-factional
political system will continually exist until one of the factions
faded out of the political arena. Instead of having a cycle of
formation and decline of consensus created by the power-balancing
equilibrium mechanism, the consensus and discordance are mainly
due their common attitudes toward improving residents' livelihood
and diverse ideology of democracy respectively. Since the DB is
only a consultative body, the real decision making power is still
in the hand of the government, so even consensus is reached by
both factions, the government may not make decisions accordingly.
In this sense, immobilism is totally not cause by the
factionalism, rather, it is provoked by the social actions raised
separately by both factions in opposing some policies. Moreover,
contrary to the twelfth feature, the vulnerability of the local
politics to external forces makes the allocation of resources
within the local arena mainly subject to officials' goodwill,
territory- political groups' influences or the change of the whole
political system in HX. In addition, the limited time and space
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of the Political opportunity created by the 1997 issue make the
factions, notably the territory SMO urgently attempt to rid
their political rivals as soon as possible rather than adopting
the passive defensive political strategy. However, it is true
that the political distrust and the threat of survival really
induce intensive defensive orientation to the local SMOs and
some of the members in the traditional faction. Notwithstanding,
the external openness of the local-political arena also poses the
factional system a code of civility and the question of
legitimacy which circumscribes the nature of conflicts only into
verbal or latent confrontations. This also makes all the
divisions within each board faction, particularly the more
ideologically indulged democratic blocs, justify their disunity
through exaggerating small dissimilarities on abstract questions
and stressing the purity of their own motives. Finally, even
though every political actors have affiliated to a faction in
order to avoid being isolated, the faction solidarity and
conformity mainly depend on their careful calculation of cost and
benefit because the resources with which factions carry out
political conflict are the personal resources which mobilized by
the individual members through their personal networks or
connections with other territory political groups. Consequently,
a dual centrifugal and centipetal processes appear. The
centipetal force is caused by the need of self-protection. It
contributes to the faction solidarity. However, since the success
on any political competitions, especially the electoral rivalry,
is ultimately determined by one's personal resources rather than
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the factional supports. Thus the individual personalities, one's
political ambition and members' personal believes rather than the
preexisting organizational aims determine the pattern of
interaction. As a result, a centrifugal force is generated and
which in turn gives rise to the pervasiveness of personalized
pattern of politics within each factions. Even though some
political groups have quite formal regulation to discipline their
members, the relatively more important of one's personal
resources than those of the organization make 'exit' a reasonable
reaction for those members who dissatisfied with the regulation.
In sum, the centrifugal force threaten the solidarity of the
faction. Nevertheless, corresponding to Hirschman (1970), exit is
not the only response to reflect discontents, voice and loyalty
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are also possible.16 Hirschman thought that the members in
voluntary associations and competitive political parties will
react strongly via exit and voice to express their discontents
while the members in those organizations bounded by
1 6. The use of exit has at least three limitations. First, in the
case of high inelasticity of the demand, the loss of the
organization caused by the exit of its members will be quite
small, the organization may neglect the signal of exit. Second,
if the demand is very elastic, the recuperation process of the
organization will not take place either because it has been wiped
out before it has enough time to find a solution. Third, no
matter what quality of the elasticity of demand is, the loss of
the organization will be very small, if it can find new members
as it lost the old ones. In these situations, voice will be
proved as a better alternative to exit. However, it should be
noted that the effectiveness of voice as a recuperation mechanism
is strengthened by the back-up of the threat of exit. Further
still, only under careful calculation of the opportunity cost of
exit and the cost to voice, one would decide not to exit and
voice out his dissatisfaction simultaneously. Loyalist behavior
is the response of members to endure on the bad times in hopes of
better in the future. The conditions for the loyalist behavior
are high fees for entering an organization and stiff penalties
for exit which repress either exit or voice or both by raising
the cost of these actions. See Hirschman 1970:22-7, 36-40, 82-3,92-4.
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pseudo-kinship interpersonal relationship will only voice and
seldom exit. (1970:121) Since the two internal divisions of the
democratic faction are constituted by those neighborhood or
semi-party associations, their members have a relatively low cost
of exit and voice. This reinforces the politics of confrontation
among them. If compromises cannot be made, exit becomes their
major form of reaction toward disagreement. Additionally, it is
composed of a number of organizations with low power
differentiation, this makes the entry and exit costs relatively
lower because one can easily joint another group when he finds
himself unsuitable to his original group. On the contrary, the
traditional faction, it is composed of comparatively less
organized individuals with high power differentiation. Moreover,
it is more resourceful and more bounded by their close friendship
ties, these greatly increase their entry and exit costs. Thus
loyalist behaviors are more easily found in the traditional
faction than the democratic faction. In other words, the
solidarity within the traditional group is higher than that of
the democratic groups
2. 88 and 89 Elections
The failure in 85 and 86 elections forced the traditional
faction to change its strategies,having many favorable factors
that the democratic faction do not have, the traditional faction
successfully regain much of its lost power in the 88 and 89
elections. Although, in 88 DB election, the democratic faction
nominated candidates to compete with the traditional faction, all
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the traditional incumbents were re-elected. Mloreover, the gap of
votes received by the two factions was eminently reduced.
additionally, most of the failed traditional candidates only lost
with a very small margin. In 89 RC election, the traditional
group not only jot the seat which previously occupied by the
democratic faction, but also won with a comfortable margin. The
electoral results are listed below:
Table 15a
88 DB Electoral Results in Districts with
Pressure Group Candidates
Background of Marginal
Constituency Candidates No. of Votes Result Difference
Tai Hing Pressure Group 4905 Elected
Pressure Group 4366 Elected 539
Traditional 1283 Failed 2083
Traditional 753 Failed 530
TM South East Traditional 2767 Elected
Pressure Group 2454 Elected 313
Traditional 2230 Failed 224
Pressure Group 1742 Failed 488
Yau Oi Pressure Group 2109 Elected
Pressure Group 2071 Elected 38
Traditional 1830 Failed 261
TM North West Traditional 2405 Elected
Pressure Group 1707 Elected 698
Traditional 1031 Failed 671
TM South West Pressure Group 2132 Elected
Traditional 1580 Elected 552
Pressure Group 1140 Failed 440
TM Town Center Pressure Group 1254 Elected
Traditional 1171 Elected 83
602Pressure Group Failed 569
123Unidentified Failed 479
2528Pressure Group ElectedCastle Peak
412487 ElectedTraditional
979 FailedPressure Group 1508
71905 FailedPressure Group
2747 ElectedPressure GroupShan King




89 RC Electoral Result
Background of
MarginalConstituency Candidates No. of Votes Result DifferenceTuen Mun East Traditional 8310 Elected
Pressure Grnn 2331 Failed 5979
Tuen Mun West Pressure Group 9573 Elected
Tracitional 4785 Failed 4798
There are several reasons for the successful strike back of
the traditional group. First, their concern of the local social
problems and emphasis on the propagation of their performance
imply that the residents are no longer able to differentiate them
from the democratic members in those livelihood issues.
Furthermore, the confrontational posture, unconventional
influence tactics, appeal to mass sentiments and mobilizational
fervour are widely adopted by the traditional groups, this again
blurs their boundary. The only way of distinguishing them is
their ideology toward democracy. Nonetheless, many studies of HK
Political culture revealed that most of the people are political
apathetic. (Shively 1972) Although they are coffinitivety and
affectively aware of the governmental output, they seldom orient
themselves a active political role. (King 1977) The people
mainly concern with their own living, though there is an
increased awareness of the relevance the government to their
Eivelihood, the sense of political powerlessness have not, yet
been allayed. Despite of their Praise of some unconventional
methods as more effective ways of urging the government to meet
Their demands, indedre way few of them sctually involve in these
Minds of social action. A discrepancy of preference and outcome
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toward political participation is quite pervasive among the
people. (Lau and Kuan 1986) In a study carried out in 1985, Lau
and Kuan (1988:71) found that 52.6% of respondents agreed or
agreed very much on the statement The purpose of political
participation is to improve the livelihood of myself and my
family. It is not for the sake of realizing political ideals,
while only 28.1% disagreed or disagreed very much. This showed
that most of the people had an instrumental attitude toward
politics. This kind of pragmatism is not only oriented toward the
government, but also directed to the elected representative, thus
they will vote whoever can really help them to resolve their
daily livelihood problems. They have little interest about the HK
political reform. As a result the ideological appeals of the
democratic groups are not only ineffective to draw the attention
of the residents, but also unable to make the residents
discriminate them from the traditional groups. Nearly all the
democratic informants, except one, admitted that though the Tuen
Mun residents were comparatively more politicized than those in
other HK districts, their cares of the purely political affairs
were still very finite. One of them noted,
"The residents seldom discuss the political affairs or
central governmental policies with us. They only show
interests in those affairs related to their immediate
personal troubles. although we organize a number of
political activities like wxhibtions, talks or study
groups about the political reforms, the attendance
rates alTtiays disappoint us".
In contrast to the situation in 85 and 86 elections, the
people now see no differences between the traditional leaders and
the pressure groups leaders, therefore they will certainly
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reconsider the traditional leaders as their preferred
representatives. Second, the democratic groups face with great
difficulty in explicating their ideals due to the complexity of
the nature of politics nowadays. 17 Besides, the ideal of
democracy advocated by the democratic groups is far less concrete
than their livelihood policies suggestions, they seldom give a
clear picture of what democracy should look like. Fighting for
direct LegCo election as soon as possible seems to be their most
concrete hallmark, but concerning the content of what human
rights should cover, formal procedures to monitor the government,
the detailed relationship between government and citizens, the
role of mass media, and other related issues, they often take a
17. As Riesman and Glazer (1955) suggested that the pervasiveness
of political apathy among today people was mainly due to the
increase of governmental intervention in the civil society which
drew the mass public into direct encounter with the complexity of
the political community. Moreover, the increase of the technical
and complicated nature of the political decisions made more and
more people feeling incompetent to participate. As a result, the
incomprehensibility and incompetence of politics rationalized
people's feeling of personal impotence. Political apathy was
certainly the corollary. In this sense, once the democratic
groups cannot make their claim understandable to the residents,
they are hard to mobilize them directly involved in the
democratic movement.
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reactive attitude toward these things. Only when these matters
come into public as a result of the initiation of the government
or the happening of some provoking incidents, they will formulate
a corresponding response. In this sense, they are rather passive
and lock of initiatives to deal with other issues related to the
solid form of democracy, except demanding dircet election. Is
This further camouflages th divergency between the traditional
and the democratic groups. As one of the traditional leaders
commented,
"I don't think we have any dissimilarity between our
camp and the new camp. I always disagree with those who
treating us as conservative or even anti-democratic. In
fact, we are democratic also. What differentiates us
from the new camp is only our attitude toward the time-
plan in carrying out the political reform. In the long
term, we favor direct LegCo election, but we only fear
that bringing it too fast may interrupt the prosperity
and stability of HK. So I think the label of gentle
democrat rather than conservative is more appropriate
to us, while the new camp should be known as the
radical democrat."
Third, as many social problems in Tuen Mun have been
substantially handled by the government, the personal troubles of
the residents can hardly be aggregated into some district-wide
policy suggestions. That means the issues which can induce public
arousal are decreasing. Consequently, one of the favorable
condition which considerably contributed to the success of the
pressure groups in mobilizing the people has lost. People now
The premature and vague advocacy of the democratic groups is
mainly due to the very limited time for which they can utilize in
seizing of power.
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instead of countenaAncing the unconventional social action, they
would like to join some recreational or leisure activities.
Because of the resourcefulness and the willingness of the
traditional groups to hold these activities, this gives them an
advantage over their rivals. Additionally, this also urges the
democratic members to re-orient their attitude in providing
recreational activities. This once again fosters their
convergence. Since most of the people's personal troubles are
hard to be resolved through former unconventional means, the
extensive networks of the traditional members provide them more
alternatives which the democrats usually lack in aiding the
residents. This also accounts why the traditional group got back
many supports in recent elections. Fourth, the recognition of the
consultative nature of DB by the residents further diminishes
their mobilizability in electoral affairs. Since they are
instrumental to every elected office, once they know that their
chosen representatives are incapable to resolve their problems,
they will lose incentive to vote. A new camp member observed,
"I think the overall decline of voting rate chiefly
counts for our unsatisfactory electoral performance. In
1985, voting was a fashion among the residents because
they. thought DB as a actual decision malting entity. In
order to select a competent and responsible
representative, they were easily mobilized by us.
However, this propitious condition cannot be sustained
to 1988 election because they have become more mature
and do understand the limitation of DB members. This
significantly decrease their voting in otivatjon. As a
resiult, we found more strenuous to mobilize them to
vote for us."
Loci mohilizahility of the HK Chinese is well known and Tuen
iun people have no exception either. In Chow's study (1988:42),
only 21.8% of respondents had joined the residents' association,
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while only 19% of these members of residents' associations
described their participation as active. Since the democratic
leaders' mobilization resources primarily come from volunteers,
the low mobilizability of the residents has constrained the
numbers of volunteers they could recruit. In addition, they also
encounter the problems of retaining them. Thus their mobilizing
ability has no remarkable increase or even decrease in these
sequential years. In contrast, the patronage nature of the
traditional camp can ensure the stability of the support of
MACs and local traditional organizations. Thus their mobilizing
capacity will only be raised rather receded. In addition, these
solid supports become more significant in the low-voting-turnout
elections because of its invariable nature. If it is assumed
that an equal portion of vote loss are received among the
candidates, those with a solid votes, which is unchangeable to
external conditions, will gain a superiority to those who do not
have any. It is because the proportional weight of these solid
votes will ascend if mobilization capacity of the both parties
is parallel. From the below table,19 except the two members of
19. Since the constituency of Tuen Mun South West has been
splitted into two constituency, so two members of the pressure
groups have not been assessed in this table.
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pressure groups in Tai Hing20 without suffering from the decline
of voting turnout, others did meet with severe drops. On the
other hand, the traditional camp members could maintain or even
uplift their received votes.
Table 16
Percentage of Vote Change for those Candidates Involved
in both 85 and 88 DB Elections
Background Previous Current Percentage
of Candidates Votes Received Votes Received of Change
Pressure Group 4097 4366 7%
Pressure Group 4740 4905 3%
Pressure Group 14%2941 2528
Pressure Group -25%3522 2454
Pressure Group -35%3253 2109
Pressure Group -36%3218 2071
Traditional 918 2487 171%
Traditional 1438 1814 26%
Traditional 1974 2405 22%




Fourth, the mobilizing efficacy of the traditional camp has
been monumentally hoisted after some of its members seek help
from the leftist forces. It is most prominent in the 89 RC
election. In Tuen Mun East, the traditional camp candidate not
only defeated his opponent, but also got the highest voting
percentage among all the RC and UC candidates. His campaign and
20 As told by some local SMOs' members, Tai Hing is a very
strange constituency. -Its residents have great voting spur
Moreover, one of the pressure group candidate has established
uncommon social prestige after his case of being assaulted which
was suspiciously due to electoral affairs.
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preparatory works were massive, including: joining some ad hoc
and sub-committees of DB in order to acquire the relevant working
experience, setting up a office which free to serve the residents
several months before the election, doing the low-returned voter
registration21 so as to impress the potential voters, organizing
many recreational activities and catching every chances to expose
himself to the public. In the election day, the volunteers that
he could recruit at least three time more than those of his
competitor. Additionally, the leftist labor unions sent his
campaign material to their members and encouraged them to vote
him. Fifth, the confrontational politics further fragmented the
strength of the democratic force. To revenge the exclusionary
strategy of MP, the local SMOs members boycotted to vote, let
alone giving them assistance. Much worse, one of them who had
just left MP several weeks before the election even helped the
traditional candidate. Finally, once the residents cannot
differentiate the candidates in terms of both their stands on
livelihood problems and their campaign strategies, people may
21. In the 85 and 86 elections, the voter registration did have
much assistance in mobilizing the potential voters, but as most
of the politically active people became the voters, its marginal
reward has been greatly reduced. Thus most of the pressure groups
seldom do that in 88 and 89 elections. The traditional force can
afford to do thrs low-returned practice because they have surplus
resources to seize every minor chance of mobilizing supports.
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return to use the criteria of Popularity, educational level,
provision of welfare and leisure activities or their first
impression to choose their preferred candidates. Since the
traditional camp no matter in terms of candidates packaging and
human talents is at least compatible with, if not better than the
democratic camp, but it is much more resourceful, so they have
greater potentiality to impress nowadays Tuen Mun electorate. As
a result, armed with so many favorable influences, the return of
the traditional force is quite understandable. To conclude, as a
democratic groups member remarked.
"I don't think the 88 and 89 electoral results
demonstrate our failure because we have ever actually
succeeded before. Our seemingly triumph in 85 and 86
election was only an accident. It was mainly because
the traditional force did not have any electoral
experience and lost faith to the public so that we
could seize this opportunity to defeat them. However,
this does not mean that we are really strong and well
established. This illusive success even inhibits our
growth and draws us into internal confrontation. Now
the traditional forces regain what they have




From this study, the extremely dependent nature of both the
patterns of Tuen Mun local politics and its local politicians is
fully exposed. The local leaders instead of effectively
influencing some unfavorable governmental decisions, they could
only passively adjusted themselves to the new environment.
Moreover, the rise or decline of every political groups depends
upon their ability to catch the opportunities created externally.
This kind of dependent nature is mainly due to the small
territory of the whole HK and the absence of local governments,
like those in Britain and USA which actually process their own
resources and autonomous decision making power. Broadly speaking,
the nature of Tuen Mun local politics are shaped by three
centrally imposed process: 1. the administrative and political
reforms determined by the center of the government; 2. the
urbanization generated by the growth of population; 3. the
penetration of the territory political groups which perceive a
chance of inheriting power left by the colonial government after
1997. These three external factors have diverse influences in
shaping Tuen Mun local politics at different time.
The political change in Tuen Mun can be portrayed into
three phases. The first stage is approximately before the 1910s.
3trictl,y speaking the officials withheld all the political power,
iut the government was deliberately not to interfere into the
Tillage affairs and gave the free hands to the rural leaders in
order to avoid any potential disputes. The local political
154
structure was assembled by the positive non-intervention
principles of government's administrative orientation. The
political power structure at that time was a monolithic one in
which all the political powers were upheld by a small number of
rural representatives who monopolized the communicative channels
between the villagers and the government. Moreover, under the
Chinese traditional political culture, they were highly respected
and their powers were seldom challenged by their fellow
villagers. However, as urbanization took place and more and more
villagers emigrated abroad or worked outside, these rural
leaders encountered a decline of power because many problems of
the villagers could be resolved by themselves or totally
irrelevant to the scope of the leaders could tackled. The second
phase was between the mid 1970s and the early 1980s. Within this
period, the government deliberately carried out an intensive
planned development scheme in Tuen Mun in order to release the
overcrowdedness in the urban areas. The disputes in land
resumption and clearance gave a chance for the revitalization of
these rural leaders because they still had certain prestige and
political power among the villagers. The government had to rely
on them to make the whole process of new town development to be
proceeded smoothly. However, as more and more new immigrants
moved in, their representativeness was challenged. In order to
articulate and meet the needs of the new immigrants, the
government set up the District Advisory Broad as a formal channel
to those new residents' leaders to voice out their opinions. But
the.rural leaders were quite conscious of this change, and they
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actively adjusted themselves to this new environment. They tried
to open themselves and to coopt the outsiders' leaders. Further
still, they kept a close friendly relationship with these
outsiders' leaders through their business ties or sponsoring
their recreational activities. In this way they could still
maintain their existing power, though some of it had been shared
by some wealthy outsiders' leaders. Nevertheless the monolithic
community power structure had not yet changed, the only variation
was that there were new elements other than the original
inhabitants' leaders jointly held the power. The third phase
begins from the mid 1980s up to present. In contrast to the above
two stages, a bifurcated power structure is emerged. The pressure
groups confiscate an opportunity given by the introduction of the
DB and RC elections which are based on universal suffrage and
break the power monopolization of the traditional leaders. Their
ability of articulating the public interests and carrying out
`new' electoral campaign strategies, and the general
dissatisfaction toward the traditional leaders, all these
contribute to the successful intrusion of the pressure groups. In
the earlier time, the traditional camp was expected to fade out
of the political arena of Tuen Mun. There were some obvious
dissimilarities between the new and the traditional groups, by
which the people could distinguished them. However, after some
sophisticated adaptive processes, the traditional clique can not
3nly retain their existing power, but also strike back in the
late 1980s. Now ideologically the two factions still have a
iistance, but in concerning th=eir attitudes toward social
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problems and their relationship with the residents, a convergence
is evidently seen. Although it is clear that there are two
different forces competing for the public power, none of them
are well organized and have sufficient capability to get rid of
the other. Moreover, both camps are characterized by
fragmentation due to their common factional nature. However, the
traditional camp is easier to reach a consensus among its
members, while the democratic camp is further splitted into two
parties and has more difficulties to make a compromise.
Individualism and personalistic patterns of interaction are quite
common among Tuen Mun politicians notably those of the democratic
bloc. No matter how similar views are taken by these factions,
collaborative works are hardly seen. Very different from the
early period, the traditional bloc has gain an advantage over
its counterpart because of its wider personal networks and
having more dispensable resources. The third phase is
characterized by the emergence of the 1997 issue which marks the
inevitability of a dual process of decolonization and
establishing a new political order. In contrast to her
traditional practice of absorbing politics through administrative
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means,' the colonial government aims at breeding all kinds of
elites in all levels, including the pressure groups' leaders. In
facing with this new political environment, the democratic groups
are induced to race for this power-inheriting game with the
dominant conservative forces. As a result, both of these
territory forces attempt to localize their influences to the
local districts in order to increase their capacity to win. The
most crucial determinant which moulds the present local political
pattern is the introduction of direct elections based on
1. Administrative absorption of politics is a strategy of
coopting or assimilating the grassroot elites into the
administrative decision making bodies in order to attain elite
integration and legitimacy. (King 1975) Nevertheless, this kind
of absorption was only restricted to the pro-government elements,
most of the radical pressure groups' leaders are seldom
appointed.---
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universal franchise.2 The effects of the direct elections are
numerous. First, elections raise the responsiveness of the local
leaders through intensifying the electoral competitions.
Elections also force the traditional leaders to become less
authoritarian and rid out those incapable members from the front
line. As a result, most of the livelihood problems of the people
are well articulated and fought by their representatives. Second,
elections give rise to a new semi-political institutions, the DB
member offices. These offices not only perform similar functions
of other government sponsored residents' associations, such as
the Kaifong associations and the MACs, but also act as a more
effective channel to mediate the communication gap between the
mass and government due to their non-pro-government nature.
Moreover, since the elected members are conscious in bettering
leader-residents relationship, their offices provide an easily
2 As observed by Lau, (1985:8-9) the decolonization process of
the Britain is rather standardized: first starts from the local
level, then proceeds to the national legislature with the
introduction of elective seats in order to encourage the
competition of the political parties to inherit the left power.
Her exact practice in HK includes: 1. setting up DBs at the local
level, which are charged with consultative functions and with a
partially elected membership 2. restructuring the half elected
UC and the establishment of a largely similar RC in the New
Territories 3. introducing indirect elective elements in the
LegCo, which paves the way of future direct LegCo elections.
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accessible means for the people to compliant and communicate
with them. Third, though elections foster the institutionaliza-
tion of the local political groups, while at the same time they
induce intensive factionalism because of aggravating the
conflicts in distributing of political power. Fourth, even
though elections raise the responsiveness of the leaders, the
sense of citizenship has not yet be implanted in the mind of the
residents. The instrumental mentality of the people do not have
any change, even worse, it is further reinforced by the
increasing responsiveness of the leaders. They are more mature in
terms of recognizing the importance of their vote to the local
leaders, but their localistic concerns in the livelihood problems
do hinder the leaders to consider the local issues at a wider HK
perspective. In turn, this affects the integration between the
local and the territory-wide political systems.
At present, how the political power structure in Tuen Mun
will change is still uncertain, but what can be confirmed are:
1. This bifurcated power structure will be sustained, once the
two democratic factions can ignore their previous internal
conflicts and jointly counteract the strike back of the
traditional group. 2. Unlike the past, the traditional group is
now more responsive to the needs of the residents and has also
built up a good relationship with them. This tendency will be
continued, once there are some persons contesting with it. 3.
The autonomy of the local political groups will be reduced as
many territory political groups are attempting to penetrate into
Tuen Mun in order to increase their political influences at the
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future elected LegCo. Since these territory political groups are
much more resourceful and well organized than those Tuen Mun
local groups, once some of these local politicians have close
connection with the territory organizations, this will urge the
rest to seek .same kind of supports.3 As well, if the local
politicians want to climb up the political ladder, a territory
orientation is very important and this will make them associate
with the territory political entities. 4. As the public
facilities become more adequate, the local political groups,
including the democratic faction, will orientate to provide more
recreational and welfare activities rather than simply organize
those hard-sold political functions.4 5. All the factions in
Tuen Mun will become more and more institutionalized in response
to the political development of HK. Among the three visible
3 The most illustrative example is the connection built up by
some of the traditional members with the leftist organizations
and the HK Progressive Society. One of the reasons for them to
establish such kind of association is that they treat Meeting
Point as a powerful territory political body which seriously
threaten their survival, so they have to seek same kind of
political supporters.
4 An outstanding example of this trend is illustrated by the
proportion of these activities held by the democratic DB member
offices. In the past, only few or even none of the recreational
and welfare functions were organized, but now these activities
constitute a dominant portion.
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factions,5 all of them attempt to or have set up formal
procedures to regulate their members because only through
corporatization they can increase their efficiency and
effectiveness in mobilizing the people and organizing
activities.6 6. Purely non-political neighborhood organizations
seem to be faded out and all groups will act in accordance with
careful political-oriented cost and benefit calculation. Further
5 Visibility is defined in terms of other groups treating the
faction as a `person' or single political actor rather than only
an aggregate of persons. Under this definition, the collection of
the local SMOs should be regarded as a faction even though they
are the most fragmented and least organized than the other two:
MP and the traditional group, which is often labelled as the
Rural Committee faction (but calling it as traditional faction is
much more preferable because many of its members do not belong to
the Tuen Mun Rural Committee so they have no formal obligation
toward it).
6. Therefore, the traditional faction established the Joint DB
members Office to coordinate separate members and organize
cooperative works. The local SMOs also intend to form a more
institutionalized alliance' so that they can pool up all their
human as well as material resources in order to work efficiently.
Although their bargaining processes are harsh and filled with
distrust, finally a compromised result seemed to be reached in
April 1989. However, one of the SMOs at the last moment decided
not to join due to its reluctance to lose autonomy.
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Politicization among the Tuen Mun local organizations will be
predicted7. Since every political groups want to extend their
organizational linkages to every non-political associations in
order to aggrandize their mobilizing capacity, these associations
will be drawn directly in elections or indirectly in the
conflicts among these political groups.8 7. The local government
officials will face increasing pressure from both traditional and
democratic blocs. Ideologically, the democratic faction declares
to monitor the performance of the officials, they will not give
`face' to the officials when they find them mis-behaved. Unlike
the past, as the local officials have been losing their
patronizing ability due to the centralization of the provision of
public facilities and the introduction of representative
government, the traditional leaders recognize that their ultimate
power sources are come from the electorate instead of the local
officials, so they will become more anti-government to praise the
residents even at the expense of the good relationship with the
officials. Eventually, the government encounters more and more
difficulties in formulating and implementing her local policies
because her technocratic consideration is increasingly
constrained by the political concerns of the local elected
Even those local SMOs, which -mostly stressed -the purity of_
serving the residents- also-put-political consideration as their-
first priority in decision making.
S. The intensive involvement of the government sponsored MACs in
electoral affairs well illustrated this point.
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leaders. 8. Although the direct LegCo election induces a tendency
of increasing interference of the territory political groups, the
LegCo election is still regionally based, in addition of the even
more narrowly district-grounded DB and RC elections, a
localistic orientation is engendered among the local politicians
because they cannot make some decisions only for the sake of the
goodness of HK as a whole while sacrificing their immediate power
sources, the local residents. In certain extent, it may also
pose some coordination problems between the local politicians
and their territory political groups because these organizations
often evaluate government policies in terms of HK as a whole.9
9. Professionalization of the politicians, though far from
institutionalized, seems to be the trend. Since the competition
in Tuen Mun is quite intense, most of the elected DB members
find great difficulty in dealing with both their jobs and the
works of DB or RC simultaneously. Furthermore, all elected
members have established an office to serve for the residents,
so they have to employ staffs to handle the daily routine works.
Unless they have substantial financial aids to employ many
staffs, otherwise they cannot act as a successful DB member
9 For instance, in the case of the Vietnamese refugee, central
MP sided for the open camp policy of the government, however, in
facing with great discontent from the Tuen -Nun residents, its
Tuen Mun members ignored the central decision and carried out
some quite radical actions to oppose this policy.
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give upwithout full time devotion. Therefore, some of them even give up
their jobs and serve as a full-time DB members. Although the
speed of professionalization seems to be extremely slow, as the
well established and resourceful territory political bodies begin
to actively penetrate the local districts, it may help advancing
this process.l0
B. Reflections on the Democratic Movement in HK
Although the HK democratic movement has its origin in the
late 60s, the democratic SMOs mostly arouse during the onset of
the Sino-British negotiation. In its early development phase,
the whole movement was carried out against the colonial rule in
an ad hoc and issue-oriented manner. But after they recognized
the historical opportunity of democratizing the HK political
system, the leadership of the movement began to be more actively
involved in the institutional electoral competitions. Under a
pervasive optimistic atmosphere among the democratic members,
they attempted to localize themselves in order to build up a
grassroot ground. Nevertheless, the whole movement is hard to
establish as a powerful political force, as Lau (1983-:23)
noticed,
10 However, at present, even the territory party-liked political
organizations are far from taking shape, so this process will not
be clearly visible in these few years time.
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"all of them are small, loosely organized and made up
mainly of cadres. There are not much of an established
hierarchy of leadership, a binding platform and
organizational discipline... As of now, the thin layer
of pro-democratic political leadership is weak and
fragmented, and divided by personal grudges and
jealousies."
These characteristics are fully exposed in Tuen Mun
political arena. At least two facts are outstandingly found
among the Tuen Mun's SMOs, let alone the general limitations of
lacking resources and volunteers. First, they face with the
problems of internal factionalism. Secondly, they find themselves
less likely to be distinguished from the conservative forces by
the common people. These two detrimental phenomena strongly
fetter their further development. Internally, the Tuen Mun
democratic force is divided into the territory SMOs and a number
of small local SMOs while these local SMOs are further fragmented
by their mutual distrust and reluctant to be subordinate to
other SMOs. Their low power differentiation and the lack of
charismatic leaders make none of them willing to follow the
others, all of them want to be the leading one. As a result, in
addition to the internal factionalism, personalized patterns of
interaction are commonly found among them. Moreover, this kind of
personalized and factional features are further reinforced by
their perception of the zero-sum political reality. They are not
eager to help the others for fearing that once their counterparts
get stronger, they are no longer able to compete with them. As
most of them recognize that they can still survive politically
even without any political groups' supports. Thus once they find
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their objectives and attitudes are different from those
organizations they belonged to, they will leave and affiliate
with another similar groups or act as an individual politicians
without any great loss. Externally, they find more and more
difficult to compete with their conservative opponents because
their rivals are more resourceful than them. Moreover, their
mobilizing ability is declining due to the instrumental attitudes
of the residents and lack of critical issues to articulate. Their
convergence in both electoral strategies and attitudes toward
community livelihood problems implies their previously advantage
over the conservative forces have lost. Even though they can be
ideologically distinguished by the common people, after the
determination of the Basic Law, can their claims of
democratizing the HK political system still well function among
most of the instrumental and realistic mass?
The rise of the pressure groups in HK might be a historical
accidents which based on the non-involvement of both the
territory conservative political groups and the leftist
organizations as well as the incapability of the local
conservative groups to perceive the new rules of game. Moreover,
the democratic leaders were too optimistic on their ability to
intrude into the polity, they all have great political ambition
which hindered their mutual cooperation. In addition, under the
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limited time and space provided, a feeling of urgency and
determination made most of them actively seize any available
power and sacrifice consolidating their grassroot ground. As a
result, most of the SMOs established are actually without any
substantive growth in these years. Although some popular
democratic leaders have emerged, their power bases are very
instable. Their most effective ways to mobilize the voters are
the campaign strategies, their intensive media coverage through
using some unconventional methods to appeal mass sentiments,
better educational level and young age. However, these things are
not intrinsic to the democratic members, the conservative groups,
though at first quite unfamiliar to these `new' electoral rules,
can easily learn from them. Once the conservative groups had
adjusted themselves, the main determinants are the processed
resources and the grassroot. Since both the democratic and
conservative forces lack grassroot supports, but the conservative
groups are more resourceful, thus in the long term, the
democratic groups are more unfavorable. Moreover, after the
active participation of the territory conservative political
groups and the leftwing forces in the late 80s, the democratic
movement is tremendously halted. Likewise, the democratic should
also consider the relationship between establishing the political
organizations and the continuity of the democratic movement. Is
11. In 1985, there were only thirteen years for them to foster a
political reform and the only space available for them to intrude
into the polity.
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the seizing political power necessarily compatible with the
democratic movement? The success of democratic groups in gaining
power may pre-terminate the movement without wholly achieving the
movement goals. As Smith noted,
Movements and parties actually foster a segmentation
of political life: the movement demands commitment and
active participation from its followers, whilst the
party treats its version of the mass public, the
electorate, as a largely passive reservoir of voting
support. (1976:331)
Once the SMOs want to develop into a political party, the
leadership will be forced to de-radicalize themselves so as to
perform well in the elections. Instead of actively urging radical
chances of the society, the leadership will more likely accept
the status quo and only propose some minor incremental reform
programs. A goal displacement may occur. Other than achieving the
movement goals, the leadership will seek changes to maintain the
existence of the organization and perpetuate their power gained.
At the time being, the democratic groups should reflect on
their radical turn in seizing the present institutional power
because the over-active electoral involvements not only draw away
dispensable resources that can be used to build up a grassroot
foundation, but also lead to internal cut-throat competition
which further shatters the already fragmented democratic camp.
However, this does not mean the democratic groups should totally
withdraw from all elections, it only suggests that rather wholly
devoted to elections, most of the members should return to
organize the grassroot. Only a limited number of people should
be nominated to run for the elections in order to maintain a
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political linkage. Until consolidating sufficient power should
they massively run for elections. At present, they are more
appropriately to act as a minority group in the formal political
institution which is mainly responsible for monitoring the
government rather than holding it. At the grassroot level, they
should actively organize the people and arouse their sense of
citizenship. Since it seems to be impossible for the democratic
groups to succeed the left power, their only way to democratize
the future political system is to arouse the sense of
citizenship of the mass, raise their sense of political efficacy
and reduce their political alienation in order to urge the power
holders to be responsive and allow public participation. As
Huntington (1985:272) noted,
With respect to the processes necessary to bring about
democratic development, a central requirement would
appear to be that wither the established elites within
an authoritarian system or the successor elites after
an authoritarian system collapses see their interests
served by the introduction of democratic institutions.
Ideology plays a significant role in the course of any
social movement. First, as a focus of integration, ideological
beliefs define the socially included and provide the symbols as
well as language necessary for maintaining the distinction with
other groups. Ideology also enhances the sense of likeness by
identifying oppositional groups. Second, ideology acts as a means
of legitimizing the aspirations, demands and goals of a movement.-
Intellectually, it maps out a problematic reality, outlines a
plausible historical causation, and suggests some reasoned
methods of resolving present afflictions. Morally, ideology
provides some imperatives, such as justice, freedom, human right
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or nation, to propel a powerful thrust for action. However, it
becomes effective only if the explanation is accepted. Third,
ideology serves as a basis for strategy, tactics, and policies.
There is usually a program of change which is open for
discussion, experimentation and reformulation. Fourth, ideology
also acts as a mechanism for exerting internal control over the
behavior of the members. (Kolinsky and Paterson 1976:21-2)
However, when examining the ideology of the HK democratic
movement, it is full of ambiguity and lack of contents. The
strategies used are totally not derived from their ideology, but
inherited from their past practices or learned from overseas
electoral experiences. All these can easily be imitated by other
conservative groups. Moreover, except for some vague moral
justification, the HK democratic groups seldom work out any
comprehensive policy alternatives or governing programs to make
them distinctive from their rivals. Further still, the ideology
of HK democratic movement has ever developed into a internal
disciplinary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the members.
As a result, the people, no matter the middle or lower classes,
only see the fundamental demarcation between them and the
conservatives lying on the electoral struggles. Thus if the
democratic movement is to be sustained and having impact on the-
Hip society, the movement leaders should seriously reflect on
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